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Frank D. LoMonte* 
Fouling the First Amendment: Why Colleges Can’t, 
and Shouldn’t, Control Student Athletes’ Speech on 
Social Media 
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Playing for the national basketball champion University of Louisville 
Cardinals is a rarefied existence. Players showcase their talents in a new $238 
million state-of-the-art coliseum with 71 VIP suites and hundreds of high-
definition television monitors, described by coaches as “the best arena in America.”1 
They benefit from private tutoring at what the university boasts is “the finest 
academic facility in the nation,” open more than 90 hours a week.2 They’ve been 
President Obama’s honored guests at the White House.3 But there is one luxury 
Louisville players do not enjoy: Privacy. Since 2011, their university has required 
athletes to sign a contract agreeing to have their personal social-media accounts 
reviewed by a monitoring company, UDiligence, which alerts the Louisville athletic 
department if any of 406 “flagged” words pop up on a player’s Twitter or Facebook 
page.4 Some of the words, including the names of sports agents with whom contact 
 
© 2014 Frank LoMonte  
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Brumby Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Georgia School of Law, 2014. 
 1. See Marcus Green, KFC Yum! Center Tipoff Comes After Twists, Turns, THE COURIER-JOURNAL 
(Louisville), Oct. 10, 2010, http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20101010/SPORTS0203/310100025/KFC-
Yum-Center-tipoff-comes-after-twists-turns (describing October 2010 opening of Cardinals’ amenity-filled 
basketball arena); Eric Crawford, “Big Time Scoring: University of Louisville among nation’s top sports 
programs financially,” THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Dec. 4, 2011, available at http://www.courier-
journal.com/article/20111203/SPORTS02/312030126/University-of-Louisville-sports-revenue (quoting Univ-
ersity of Louisville head men’s basketball coach Rick Pitino praising the new KFC Yum! Center, which was 
credited with helping make the men’s basketball program the nation’s most lucrative with $40.9 million in 
revenue). 
 2. Univ. of Louisville Dep’t of Athletics, ON CAMPUS, ACADEMICS & SUPPORT, GOCARDS.COM, 
http://www.gocards.com/school-bio/student-athletes.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). 
 3. James R. Carroll, President Barack Obama Hails University of Louisville for NCAA Championship, 
Predicts More Success, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), July 23, 2013, http://www.courier-journal.com/ 
article/20130723/NEWS01/307230060/President-Barack-Obama-hails-University-Louisville-Cardinals-NCAA-
championship-predicts-more-success. 
 4. Mark Boxley, UK and U of L Monitoring Many Athletes’ Social Media Postings, THE COURIER-JOURNAL 
(Louisville), Aug. 21, 2012, at A1. 
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is forbidden, plainly suggest red-flag behavior. Others, including a thesaurus-full of 
synonyms for “breasts,” are potentially more benign.5 
Louisville is by no means an outlier. College athletic powerhouses from Florida 
State to Boise State are enforcing curbs—or even wholesale bans—on how athletes 
use social networking sites.6 The instructions given to football players at Virginia’s 
Old Dominion University exemplify how deeply colleges are involving themselves 
in their athletes’ online lives: Don’t use Twitter—ever. Don’t use Facebook unless 
you “friend” the athletic department, so administrators can read what you’re saying. 
Don’t write anything that might “reflect poorly” on the university.7 
What makes social media novel and empowering—that it is an immediate, 
unfiltered way to “speak” with thousands of people at once—is also what makes it 
frightening to campus regulators. The ability to build a vast online audience with no 
financial investment also brings with it the ability to widely broadcast intemperate 
remarks revealing prejudices,8 ethically dubious behavior,9 or simply a lack of good 
taste.10 
Interjecting school authority into what student-athletes say on social media even 
in their personal, off-campus hours implicates a host of constitutional 
 
 5. Eric Bentley, Unnecessary Roughness: Why Athletic Departments Need to Rethink Whether to Aggressively 
Respond to the Use of Social Media by Athletes, 75 TEX. B. J. 834, 838 (2012). 
 6. See, e.g., Ken Paulson, College Athlete Tweet Ban? Free Speech Sacks That Idea, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 
2012, at 9A (listing athletic programs at Boise State, South Carolina, Mississippi State and Towson among those 
that have banned or limited athlete’s Twitter usage); David M. Hale, Seminoles Fine With Social Media Ban, 
ESPN (Aug. 1, 2012) http://www.espn.go.com/colleges/fsu/story/_/id/8193190/florida-state-seminoles-looking-
restrict-social-media-use-players (reporting that FSU head football coach banned use of Twitter during football 
season after “ill-advised” postings, including several during the offseason by athletes critical of the local police 
department); see also Bentley, supra note 5, at 835–36 (2012) (“Rather than run the risk of waiting to see if an 
athlete will post something damaging to the university, some athletic departments are banning social media, 
requiring athletes to ‘friend’ a coach, requiring athletes to provide their social media passwords, or even 
installing an application to be alerted to offensive postings”); Meg Penrose, Outspoken: Social Media and the 
Modern College Athlete, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 521 n.60 (2013) (naming Michigan and 
Kentucky, in addition to Louisville, as major-college programs that require athletes to accept monitoring of 
their social-media activity); Patrick Stubblefield, Evading the Tweet Bomb: Utilizing Financial Aid Agreements to 
Avoid First Amendment Litigation and NCAA Sanctions, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 593, 596 (2012) (identifying Loyola 
University-Chicago as the first to entirely ban athletes from social media sites, followed by Kent State, the 
University of Minnesota, the University of New Mexico and others). 
 7. Harry Minium, Tweet Surrender, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Sept. 15, 2012, at 1.  
 8. Suzanne Haliburton, Burnette Apologies to Teammates for Posting of Racial Slur, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, Nov. 6, 2008, at C1 (describing University of Texas’ decision to expel a player from the football 
team for using a racial slur about newly elected President Obama in a Twitter post on his personal account). 
 9. See Stubblefield, supra note 6, at 596 (describing the case of University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
football star Marvin Austin, whose social-media postings bragging about frequenting posh Miami nightclubs 
and showing off an expensive watch and sunglasses led to an NCAA investigation of the UNC program resulting 
in significant penalties). 
 10. See, e.g., Jake Trotter, OU Suspends Receiver Jaz Reynolds for Twitter Comments About Texas, 
OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 29, 2010, http://newsok.com/ou-suspends-receiver-jaz-reynolds-for-twitter-comments-
about-texas/article/3499714 (last viewed Aug. 2, 2013) (relating story of University of Oklahoma football player 
suspended for key rivalry game after posting sarcastic Twitter comment encouraging residents of Austin, home 
to the rival University of Texas, to kill themselves). 
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uncertainties. The rationales offered for this incursion into individual liberty range 
from protecting the school (against harm to its image, or from NCAA sanctions for 
illicit athlete behavior) to protecting the athlete (against self-inflicted reputational 
damage, or from speech by ill-intentioned outsiders). 
Restrictions on athletes’ social-media use have ranged from outright bans,11 to a 
requirement to disclose passwords and login information so schools can monitor 
communications that aren’t publicly visible,12 to penalties for specific remarks that 
officials of the athletic department regard as “inappropriate.”13 The authority of 
college athletic departments to make and enforce such policies has thus far gone 
unchallenged in the courts, although it has attracted the attention of legislators in a 
handful of states where “social media privacy” statutes have been enacted.14 
At a public institution, the First Amendment protects students’ ability to express 
themselves free from government sanction, and the Due Process Clause protects 
against the removal of public benefits in an arbitrary way or without adequate 
notice.15 Outside the realm of athletics, a public university would be constitutionally 
estopped from penalizing speech—especially speech that takes place on a personal 
computer on personal time—merely because it projects an unfavorable image of the 
student or the school.16 Is there something so unique about the college/athlete 
relationship that it justifies discarding well-established constitutional principles? 
Colleges point to several justifications for assuming authority over student-
athletes’ off-campus speech: (1) that a student-athlete is the functional equivalent of 
an employee because of the exchange of personal services for financial benefits, and 
like an employee “represents” the school to the public, and (2) that voluntary 
 
 11. See Stubblefield, supra note 6, at 596 (identifying Loyola University-Chicago as the first to entirely ban 
athletes from social media sites, followed by Kent State University, University of Minnesota, University of New 
Mexico, and others); J. Wes Gay, Note, Hands Off Twitter: Are NCAA Student Athlete Social Media Bans 
Unconstitutional?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 796 (2012) (citing the Mississippi State University men’s basketball 
team and the New Mexico State University men’s basketball team having implemented bans on social media). 
 12. See Bentley, supra note 5, at 836. 
 13. See Gay, supra note 11, at 798–802 (2012). 
 14. See David L. Hudson Jr., Site Unseen: Schools, Bosses Barred from Eyeing Students’, Workers’ Social 
Media, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2012, at 22, 22–23 (describing Delaware’s Higher Education Privacy Act, which prohibits 
colleges from requiring that students or applicants either surrender social-media password information or log 
into any password-protected website so as to enable a school representative to view its contents). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Bentley, supra note 5, at 836. 
 16. See Bentley, supra note 5, at 836; Gay, supra note 11, at 796; see also Jamie P. Hopkins et al., Being 
Social: Why the NCAA has Forced Universities to Monitor Student-Athletes’ Social Media, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y, Spring 2013, at 1, 34 (“[U]nprotected language is not the primary issue that schools are seeking to 
address . . . yet, bragging about perks given by the athletic department, discussion about recruits, or trash-
talking coaches is not unprotected speech. But in fact, these are precisely the kind of topics that schools are 
seeking to prevent from being posted by their athletes in order to avoid a bad reputation and NCAA 
sanctions.”). 
LOMONTE PP2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2014  2:00 PM 
 Fouling the First Amendment 
4 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
participation in athletics waives—either implicitly or by written agreement—a 
degree of individual freedom in exchange for the “privilege” of participation.17 
These justifications at best are legally suspect and at worst—depending on the 
intensity of control that schools exercise and the measure of punishment they 
impose – are wholly without constitutional grounding. Heavy-handed restraints on 
student-athletes’ ability to express themselves are inconsistent with concern for 
public safety and with sound educational policy. Narrower and more educationally 
productive alternatives exist to maintain team discipline while teaching “best 
practices” in the use of online media. Where a more limited incursion into free 
expression would fulfill the government’s legitimate objectives, the Constitution 
requires taking that path. 
This article looks both at the significant burdens that a college would face in 
justifying restrictions on athletes’ use of social media in the event of a constitutional 
challenge, as well as the hurdles that an athlete plaintiff might encounter in trying to 
persuade a court to entertain this relatively novel claim not perfectly analogous to 
any of the more familiar First Amendment fact patterns. It concludes that only in 
narrowly limited circumstances may a public institution force an athlete to accept 
constraints on the content of lawful off-campus speech. 
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Free Expression Fundamentals 
In the off-campus world, government constraints on the content of speech are 
viewed with justifiably deep skepticism. As the Supreme Court has declared: “The 
First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech . . . 
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.”18 While the government has somewhat greater leeway to  
 
 17. See Gay, supra note 11, at 797–802 (arguing that schools and coaches consider speech by student-
athletes to be a “privilege” as opposed to a right); Robert A. McCormick & Amy C. McCormick, The Myth of the 
Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 156 (2006) (arguing that although grant-
in aid athletes in revenue-generating sports at Division I NCAA schools meet the legal definition of employees, 
they are classified as student-athletes so that colleges can avoid having to provide them with “the protections of 
employee status”); Mary Margaret Penrose, Free Speech Versus Free Education: First Amendment Considerations 
in Limiting Student Athletes’ Use of Social Media, 1 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 71 (2011); Patrick Stubblefield, Evading 
the Tweet Bomb: Utilizing Financial Aid Agreements to Avoid First Amendment Litigation and NCAA Sanctions, 
41 J.L. & EDUC. 593, 599 (2012). 
 18. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. 
Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991)); see also Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 
46–47 (1986) (“This Court has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the 
basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.”). 
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manage the use of its own property for communicative purposes,19 regulations 
targeted purely to the content of private individuals’ speech on private property— 
for instance, restricting the types of books that may be sold or films that may be 
exhibited—almost never survive constitutional scrutiny.20 A restriction on what 
students can say during personal, off-campus time would fall into this especially 
suspect category. Courts apply especially exacting scrutiny to regulations with the 
purpose or effect of discriminating based on viewpoint.21 While a content-based 
regulation may occasionally pass constitutional muster—for instance, a regulation 
dictating that public commenters at a city council meeting must limit their 
comments to city business—a regulation allowing comments only by those 
representing one side of a contested issue would be impermissible. 
Only the narrowest subset of speech is categorically unprotected by the First 
Amendment, including “true threats” to commit violence,22 the incitement of 
imminent unlawful activity,23 or “patently offensive” sexual material that is so 
lacking in any redeeming value as to be legally obscene.24 Particularly in recent 
years, the Supreme Court has reasserted just how limited these exclusions are, 
refusing to legitimize content-based restraints even on speech of exceedingly low 
value, such as the anti-gay hate speech of military-funeral protestors affiliated with 
Westboro Baptist Church.25 
 
 19. A somewhat different (and doctrinally murky) set of legal standards applies when the government is 
regulating the expressive use of public property. See Perry Ed. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 
37, 44 (1983) (“The existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon 
such a right must be evaluated differently depending on the character of the property at issue.”). The Supreme 
Court has developed a construct – the forum doctrine – that provides varying degrees of protection for speakers 
depending on the nature of the public property the speaker seeks to use. Id. at 45 (describing the forum 
doctrine). The regulation of students’ speech on social media should present no “forum analysis” questions, 
except in the unlikely occurrence that a student seeks to use a university-provided conduit for expression, such 
as posting comments to a Facebook page maintained by the athletic department. 
 20. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (declaring unconstitutional a 
municipal ordinance that banned drive-in movie theatres from exhibiting films depicting nudity on screens that 
might be visible to children on public thoroughfares). 
 21. See Rosenberger v. Rectors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (declaring, in case involving a 
college’s refusal to fund a student newspaper because of its Christian perspective, that viewpoint discrimination 
is “an egregious form of content discrimination” and elaborating that the government “must abstain from 
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the 
rationale for the restriction”). Indeed, even on government property that is not a public forum at all, regulators 
may not preferentially pick-and-choose among speakers on the basis of viewpoint. See Holloman v. Harland, 
370 F.3d 1252, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Government actors may not discriminate against speakers based on 
viewpoint, even in places or under circumstances where people do not have a constitutional right to speak in 
the first place.”). 
 22. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–60 (2003). 
 23. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 24. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 25. Snyder v. Phelps, 1301 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (concluding that anti-gay picketing outside military 
funerals by Westboro Baptist Church, an extremist religious group, “is certainly hurtful and its contribution to 
public discourse may be negligible” but that the speech nevertheless is constitutionally protected). 
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When a government restraint on speech is not narrowly tailored so as to restrict 
only the speech that the government has a compelling interest in preventing, the 
restraint is vulnerable to challenge under the overbreadth doctrine.26 In its recent 
ruling invalidating the Stolen Valor Act, which criminalized lying about having won 
military honors, the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he First Amendment requires 
that the Government’s chosen restriction on the speech at issue be ‘actually 
necessary’ to achieve its interest. . . . There must be a direct causal link between the 
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”27  A law may be invalidated as 
facially overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, 
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”28 Assurances that 
enforcement discretion will be used judiciously do not salvage a facially overbroad 
statute. As the Court stated in striking down a federal statute that criminalized the 
distribution of images depicting animal cruelty, “the First Amendment protects 
against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige. We 
would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government 
promised to use it responsibly.”29 
The government may enforce reasonable regulations on the “time, place and 
manner” of speakers’ expression, so long as the regulations are drawn and applied 
without regard to content.30 The regulation need not be the least speech-restrictive 
means of accomplishing the government’s objective, but it must be “narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.”31 Even a content-neutral 
regulation may be overturned if it has the effect of closing off so many avenues for 
speech that a speaker has no reasonable opportunity to reach the intended 
audience.32 
Open-ended restrictions on the content of speech also are vulnerable to 
challenge under the Due Process Clause. A regulation may be declared void for 
 
 26. See United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1838 (2008) (“[A]ccording to our First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.”).  
 27. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012). 
 28. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 29. United States v. Stevens, 130 U.S. 460, 480 (2010). 
 30. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (citing as examples of permissible time, place 
and manner regulations a scheduling system that prevents two parades from competing for space on the same 
street at the same time, or a noise ordinance limiting the decibel level of amplified speech in residential areas). If 
a purported “time, place and manner” restriction is found to be content-based, it is unconstitutional unless it 
can survive strict scrutiny. See Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 365 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(applying strict scrutiny and striking down a permitting ordinance that required only those planning political 
protests, but not other public gatherings of comparable size, to obtain a permit). 
 31. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 32. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (quoting Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)) (“The First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to ‘reach the minds 
of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.’”); see also Phelps-Roper v. 
Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 372 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a speaker is not entitled to the “best means of 
communication,” only to a reasonably effective one with which the government does not interfere). 
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vagueness if it fails to give intelligible notice of the behavior that will result in 
penalties.33 A regulation may also be struck down as unconstitutionally vague if it 
delegates unfettered enforcement discretion to the executive, inviting arbitrary or 
discriminatory application.34 
A “prior restraint” is regarded as an especially noxious and disfavored brand of 
government regulation, since it prevents speech from ever being heard.35 However, 
the First Amendment forbids not merely outright prohibitions on speech, but also 
actions that intimidate or “chill” a speaker from refraining from speech (for 
instance, by raising the prospect of civil liability).36 When the speaker is a student, 
courts have found that even harsh after-the-fact condemnation of speech by school 
officials can be sufficiently intimidating as to impose an impermissible chill on the 
speech of that student and of others who witness the reproach.37 
Federal courts have fashioned doctrinal exceptions to these boilerplate 
constitutional principles in the settings of school and the workplace.38 The 
exceptions represent a compromise between the interests of authority and 
individual liberty where the speaker stands in a special relationship with the 
regulator beyond the ordinary citizen/government relationship.39 
 
 
 33. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1183–84 (6th Cir. 1995); see Serv. Emp. Int’l Union v. 
City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because the First Amendment needs ‘breathing space,’ 
government regulation must be drawn with some specificity . . . Regulation of speech must be through laws 
whose prohibitions are clear.” (citation omitted)). 
 34. See Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1183–84.  
 35. Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1045 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (“Prior restraints are not per se unconstitutional, however, prior 
restraints are highly disfavored and presumed invalid.”)). 
 36. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220–21 (2011) (overturning award of emotional distress 
tort damages against protesters whose speech touched on issues of public concern); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (finding that the First Amendment precludes an award of civil damages against the 
publisher of an editorial cartoon about a public figure, even where the cartoon is “outrageous” and inflicts 
emotional harm).  
 37. See, e.g., Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Given the gross disparity in 
power between a teacher and a student, [reproachful] comments—particularly in front of the student’s peers—
coming from an authority figure with tremendous discretionary authority, whose words carry a presumption of 
legitimacy, cannot help but have a tremendous chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights.”). In 
the Holloman case, the Eleventh Circuit found that a teacher violated a student’s First Amendment rights by 
chastising him in front of his class for raising his fist as a symbol of silent protest during the daily Pledge of 
Allegiance recitation. Id. at 1268–69; see also Smith v. Novato Unif. Sch. Dist., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 508 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) (finding that school district impermissibly chilled student commentator’s expression by issuing 
sharp denunciation of his anti-immigration editorial column, signed by principal and superintendent, asserting 
that the speech was legally unprotected and should never have been published). 
 38. See Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners – Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive 
Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1641–43 (2007) (describing, and 
critiquing as exaggerated, the rationales offered for affording reduced First Amendment rights to government 
employees, students and prisoners). 
 39. Id. 
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B. The First Amendment Goes to School (or Doesn’t) 
The Supreme Court has had only a handful of occasions to pass judgment on the 
constitutional protection of students’ on-campus speech, most frequently in the K-
12 setting. The Court’s broadest pronouncement on the limits of school regulatory 
authority came in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the 
landmark case recognizing the right of young antiwar protesters to wear black 
armbands to school despite a district-enacted ban.40 
Notably, Tinker was a compromise ruling – a halfway point between zero First 
Amendment protection and the full-force protection that would apply outside of 
school.41 The Court based its willingness to give students diminished freedoms on 
“the special characteristics of the school environment.”42 A school may enforce a 
content-based restriction on speech, the Court held, if the speech “materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
others[.]”43 
Since Tinker, the Court has recognized several categories of less-protected speech 
in the school setting, two of which are of potential significance in the student-
athlete context. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court for the first 
time applied the “public forum” analysis to students’ expressive use of school 
property, and determined that First Amendment freedoms were diminished when 
students sought to express themselves using a “curricular” vehicle, such as a class-
produced newspaper, which was operated primarily for teaching rather than 
expressive purposes.44 In Morse v. Frederick, the Court created a narrow exception 
permitting the punishment of even non-disruptive speech occurring on school 
grounds or at “school sanctioned” events if the message could reasonably be 
understood as encouraging the use of dangerous illegal drugs.45 While all of the 
Court’s student-speech cases predate the present-day popularization of social media  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 40. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 41. Id. at 511; Ronald Schildge & Michael A. Stahler, Student Speech After Morse v. Frederick: An “Unwise 
and Unnecessary” Convolution, VT. B. J., Fall 2009, at 55, 55–56. 
 42. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 43. Id. at 513. 
 44. 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988). 
 45. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
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among teens, there is little indication that the Court is inclined to create additional 
First Amendment carve-outs beyond those already recognized.46 
By contrast with its measured apportionment of First Amendment liberties at 
the K-12 level, the Court has spoken expansively of the importance of the free 
exchange even of challenging and unpopular ideas in the “marketplace” of a college 
campus.47 In Hazelwood, the Court broadly hinted that the interests of the speaker 
and the institution might balance out differently at the college level.48  The Court 
has never, however, squarely confronted the extent to which the Tinker line of 
school-speech cases applies at the college level. 
In its first post-Tinker case involving the First Amendment rights of college 
students, the Court approvingly referenced Tinker in concluding that a public 
university failed to satisfy its “heavy burden” in justifying refusal to recognize a 
campus chapter of Students for a Democratic Society.49 But in a ruling later that 
same term—holding that a public university acted unconstitutionally in suspending 
the student editor of an underground newspaper because of its offensive editorial 
content, which included strong profanity—the Court cited Tinker just once in 
passing.50 
 
 
 46. Justices Alito and Kennedy, whose votes were decisive in the Morse majority, concurred in finding the 
student’s pro-drug speech punishable “on the understanding that the opinion does not hold that the special 
characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other speech restrictions.” Id. at 422 (Alito, J., 
concurring). The Court has declined multiple invitations since 2007 to take up circuit-level rulings concerning 
schools’ authority over off-campus speech. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 
(3d Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Blue Mountain] (en banc) (holding that the school district violated a student’s free-
speech rights when the district suspended the student who created, from her home over a weekend, a social 
media website profile in the school principal’s name and filled with crude material), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 
(2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that a public school acted 
constitutionally in punishing a student who created an off-campus MySpace page cruelly ridiculing a classmate 
as having herpes), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012). 
 47. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (overturning New 
York’s requirement that college employees sign a loyalty oath, forswearing affiliation with the Communist 
Party, and declaring that a college classroom is “peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas’”). As the Court elaborated 
in Keyishian: “Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent 
value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” Id. See also 
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, 
because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on 
college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the contrary, the vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 48. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (“We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is 
appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.”). 
 49. Healy, 408 U.S. at 184. 
 50. Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 669–70 (1973). 
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Lacking unequivocal direction from the Supreme Court, lower courts at times 
rely on Tinker (and increasingly, even Hazelwood51) as the starting point for 
analyzing content-based restrictions on speech at public universities. Even in those 
situations, courts typically view content-based regulations with greater skepticism at 
the college level, in light of the maturity of the speaker and audience, and the role of 
colleges as laboratories for experimentation with ideas.52 
Often, however, regulations on college students’ speech are evaluated under the 
“real-world” standards that would apply outside the educational setting, without 
reference to student-speech jurisprudence. For example, campus “civility codes” 
commonly are evaluated—and invalidated—under the same vagueness and 
overbreadth standards that would apply to content-based regulations by a city, 
county or state.53 
One of today’s most confounding and frequently litigated First Amendment 
issues is when, if ever, a school may control the off-campus speech of its students on 
the basis that the speech can be read at, and/or cause a reaction at, school 
functions.54 These cases almost exclusively have arisen at the K-12 level, but are at 
least instructive about—if not directly applicable to—the scope of college students’ 
rights as well. 
Importantly, the Supreme Court has never said schools have authority over off-
campus speech equivalent to that of on-campus speech. In fact, the Court has quite 
strongly indicated to the contrary. In Hazelwood, the Court prefaced its ruling by  
 
 
 
 
 51. See Frank D. LoMonte, The Key Word is Student: Hazelwood Censorship Jumps the Ivy-Covered Gates, 
11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 307–08, 334–35 (2013) (commenting on the Sixth Circuit’s 2012 decision in Ward 
v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, to join the Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in applying the Hazelwood standard to 
the curricular speech of college students). 
 52. See Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis for Assessing 
Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 502 (2005). 
 53. See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that a college’s 
harassment policy was unconstitutionally overbroad, because it allowed for punishment of “offensive” or 
“gender-motivated” comments even if no listener felt a severe or pervasive level of harassment, and even if the 
comments addressed “core” political or religious expression); Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 
1183–85 (6th Cir. 1995) (invalidating on overbreadth grounds a university’s “discriminatory harassment” 
policy that defined punishable harassment as including “offensive” or “demeaning” speech, which the court 
found to encompass constitutionally protected speech); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 758 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. 
Mich. 1989) (striking down as overbroad university’s anti-harassment policy outlawing speech that “stigmatizes 
or victimizes” another person, because the policy swept in constitutionally protected speech). 
 54. See Karly Zande, When the School Bully Attacks in the Living Room: Using Tinker to Regulate Off-
Campus Student Cyberbullying, 13 BARRY L. REV. 103, 122 (2009) (discussing various ways federal and state 
courts have tried to apply Tinker in situations where the student speech originated off-campus); see also John T. 
Ceglia, Comment, The Disappearing Schoolhouse Gate: Applying Tinker in the Internet Age, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 939, 
961–64 (2012). 
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acknowledging the robust protect afforded to students under Tinker, but then went 
on: 
We have nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment rights of students 
in the public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings and must be applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment. A school need not tolerate student 
speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission even though 
the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.55 
Then in Morse, when explaining why students are given the benefit of reduced legal 
protection at school events, the Court recounted its 1986 ruling in the case of a 
student assembly speaker, Matthew Fraser, whose sexual innuendo was deemed in 
that setting to be constitutionally unprotected speech.56 The Morse Court observed: 
“Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, 
it would have been protected.”57 There is, in other words, scant legal authority 
addressing the level of control a public school may exercise over students’ off-
campus speech on personal time, but every indication that the Court regards off-
campus expression as meaningfully distinct from, and deserving of greater 
protection than, on-campus expression. 
In the earliest generation of online-speech cases to reach the judiciary, courts 
readily concluded that off-campus speech—even when posted on widely viewable 
websites—was beyond the disciplinary authority of schools.58 In those cases, courts 
regarded the location of the students’ speech (and the absence of proof that the 
speakers themselves “brought” the speech onto the campus) as an important, if not 
decisive, consideration.59 But the Second Circuit’s 2007 decision in Wisniewski v. 
 
 55. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 56. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 57. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007). 
 58. See, e.g., Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 785–86 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding 
that a high school student’s off-campus website, which was created “for laughs” and included a list of people he 
wished “would die,” did not constitute a “true threat”); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 
455–56 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (finding no school authority to punish a student for an off-campus website, links to 
which he emailed to some classmates, containing a sarcastic “Top Ten” list crudely ridiculing the school athletic 
director); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (rejecting school’s claim hat 
“mock obituaries” published on student’s off-campus website were punishable as a threat of violence); J.S. ex rel 
H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 859–65 (Pa. 2002) [hereinafter J.S.] (holding that a middle 
school student’s website did not constitute a “true threat” even though the site listed reasons a teacher should 
die, showed a picture of the teacher’s head severed from her body and joked about soliciting funds to hire a hit 
man). 
 59. See, e.g., Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 785; Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 456; Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 
1090; J.S., supra note 58, at 847. 
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Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School District60 signaled a mentality 
shift in favor of school authority. 
In Wisniewski, eighth-grader Aaron Wisniewski was punished for a series of 
otherwise-harmless instant messages sent to classmates off campus, in which he 
used as his identifying icon a crudely drawn cartoon caricature of his math teacher 
being shot in the head.61 Without Wisniewski’s knowledge or consent, one recipient 
shared a message with a classmate, who showed the cartoon icon to the math 
teacher.62 Although an investigation concluded that Wisniewski meant the cartoon 
as a joke and had no violent intentions, the teacher was so panicked that he took a 
long leave of absence and was unable to continue as Wisniewski’s teacher.63 The 
Second Circuit rejected Wisniewski’s First Amendment challenge to the discipline, 
concluding that—although occurring entirely off campus—the speech was subject 
to school regulation under the Tinker standard because of the “reasonably 
foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of school authorities.”64 
Since Wisniewski, and since social-networking sites have achieved pervasive 
worldwide popularity so as to magnify the theoretical reach and durability of 
speech, courts have been significantly more inclined to indulge schools’ incursions 
into their students’ off-campus lives. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have expressly 
treated off-campus speech on social media as the functional equivalent of on-
campus speech, equally subject to school authority within the bounds of Tinker.65 
Those cases—in the Fourth Circuit, a classic “cyberbullying” scenario in which 
students cruelly defamed a classmate by name, and in the Eighth Circuit, a 
prolonged online “chat” that devolved into a discussion of bringing guns to school 
and murdering specific individuals—presented highly unsympathetic speakers 
engaging in speech that arguably was legally unprotected even in the adult world.66 
Where speech is of greater constitutional dignity—because it touches on matters of 
public concern, or involves ridicule of school administrators and not vulnerable 
children—courts have been less deferential. The en banc Third Circuit has expressed 
doubt as to whether Tinker is adequately protective of speech taking place on the  
 
 
 60. 494 F.3d 34, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 61. Id. at 36. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 38. The court went on to acknowledge, somewhat unusually, that the judges were divided over 
whether the school had the burden of demonstrating it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech itself would 
make its way onto campus, or whether the fact that it did reach campus was enough. Id. at 39. 
 65. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Sch. 
Dist., 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter D.M.]. 
 66. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567–68; D.M., supra note 65, at 758. 
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Internet outside of school time or school functions,67 while the Second Circuit has 
equivocated.68 
In one of the few fully litigated cases involving a college student’s off-campus 
expression on a social networking site, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the 
University of Minnesota’s imposition of discipline on a graduate student studying 
to be a funeral director, because of speech perceived as violating the standards of 
her intended profession (including jokes on a Facebook wall about the cadaver she 
was assigned to dissect).69 Among the comments that the college deemed punishable 
were two joking references to using a dissecting tool to do violence to “a certain 
someone,” Tatro’s winking reference to a bad romantic breakup.70 Declining to 
follow any accepted First Amendment precedent – from the “school speech” setting 
or otherwise – the state Supreme Court fashioned a brand-new doctrine 
empowering colleges to enforce restraints on students’ off-campus speech that are 
“narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional conduct 
standards.”71 (Because of the student appellant’s death,72 no attempt was made to 
take the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, where it is doubtful in light of Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in Morse that a majority exists to recognize a new “accepted 
professional standards” exemption to the First Amendment.) 
Cases implicating students’ participation in extracurricular activities present 
distinct analytical challenges. Courts are inclined to grant schools extra deference 
when students’ speech takes place in the context of their participation in athletics, 
student government or other “optional” activities – particularly when the 
punishment is imposed within the confines of that activity.73 In an especially harsh 
 
 67. See Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915, 929–31 (3d. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (finding that, even if Tinker did 
apply to a prank posted by a middle-school student on the MySpace social networking site cruelly mocking her 
principal, the prank’s impact on the school was limited to a few momentarily distracting student conversations, 
which fell short of a punishable level of disruption). The concurrence went significantly further, opining that 
Tinker was insufficiently protective and that “the First Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus 
speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at large.” Id. at 936 (Smith, J., 
concurring). 
 68. See Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II), 642 F.3d 334, 349 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding that, whether a 
student’s off-campus blog is punishable under the Tinker standard or is subject to some greater degree of 
protection, it was objectively reasonable for school disciplinarians to believe Tinker applied, thus entitling them 
to qualified immunity in student’s First Amendment challenge); see also Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger I), 527 
F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding it likely that Tinker would provide the standard for assessing the legality of 
the school’s disciplinary action based on the precedent set forth in Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007)).  
 69. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 512–13 (Minn. 2012). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 521. 
 72. Seth Zweifler, Amanda Tatro, Who Fought Free Speech Battle Against the University of Minnesota, Dead 
at 31, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. BLOG (June 26, 2012), http://www.splc.org/wordpress/?p=3844. 
 73. See Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports 
Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 71, 119 (2008) (remarking on “the extraordinary freedom 
academic institutions have from any probing judicial scrutiny”). 
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result, the Fifth Circuit determined that a high school cheerleader had no First 
Amendment recourse after she was removed from the cheerleading squad for 
silently taking a seat during a cheer requiring her to approvingly recite the name of 
the basketball player she had accused of raping her.74 The court’s brief, unpublished 
opinion characterized the student’s role while performing her cheerleading 
assignments as “a mouthpiece through which SISD [the school district] could 
disseminate speech.”75 Likewise, the Second Circuit deferred to a principal’s 
judgment that a student leader’s blog entry – in which she used disrespectful 
language about school officials while urging members of the community to call and 
email the school to help her overturn a policy decision – reflected unfitness for her 
position as a class officer.76 The court found especially persuasive the relative 
leniency of the school’s disciplinary response, which was limited to disqualifying the 
blogger from class office, an extracurricular activity in which participation was 
voluntary.77 
C. The First Amendment Goes to Work (or Doesn’t) 
Public employees have the benefit of only limited First Amendment protection 
when speaking in their employee capacity, protection that has eroded over the last 
two decades. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court recognized that 
resolving employee-speech cases required reconciling the competing interests of the 
government in the efficient delivery of services, the employee in sharing the benefit 
of her knowledge, and the electorate in honest and effective government that is 
facilitated by unimpeded access to information.78 In Pickering, the Court sided with 
a schoolteacher who was fired over a letter-to-the-editor of the local newspaper 
criticizing the district’s funding priorities, remarking that school employees would 
have informed perspective beneficial to the public discourse.79 
The Court applied a limiting gloss on Pickering in Connick v. Myers.80 In Connick, 
a state prosecutor aggrieved by a pending reassignment decided to circulate a survey 
within the office soliciting feedback about working conditions and morale.81 When 
her supervisor found out she had distributed the survey, he fired her.82 The Supreme 
 
 74. Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 853–55 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 75. Id. at 855. 
 76. See Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger I), 527 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 77. See id. at 53 (commenting, after observing relative leniency of student’s punishment, “[w]e are mindful 
that, given the posture of this case, we have no occasion to consider whether a different, more serious 
consequence than disqualification from student office would raise constitutional concerns.”). 
 78. 391 U.S. 563, 568–72 (1968) (holding a teacher’s dismissal for writing a letter on issues of public 
importance cannot be upheld and concluding that limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public 
debate is not significantly greater than limiting a similar contribution from the general public). 
 79. Id. at 572–73. 
 80. 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). 
 81. Id. at 140–41. 
 82. Id. at 141. 
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Court concluded that the survey was primarily about, and was motivated by, 
unhappiness over internal workplace conditions rather than matters of genuine 
public concern, and thus was entitled only to “limited” First Amendment regard.83 
As a result of Connick, “public concern” has become a reviewing court’s threshold 
inquiry before the duty to balance the parties’ interests under Pickering even comes 
into play. 
The Court significantly narrowed Pickering’s scope in Garcetti v. Ceballos.84 In 
Garcetti, a deputy district attorney was disciplined for circulating an internal memo 
critical of the work of his office and the police department in preparing a search 
warrant.85 In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that if employees are engaged in speech 
“pursuant to their official duties,” that speech is entirely without First Amendment 
protection.86  Because the prosecutor was assigned to prepare the memo as part of 
his work responsibilities, he was not speaking as a citizen, and there was no need to 
conduct a Pickering balancing of interests.87 
Properly understood, Garcetti stands for the unremarkable proposition that, 
when speaking about a particular subject is a part of an employee’s job description, 
that speech is the government’s speech, in which the employee has no personal 
expressive interest of constitutional dimension. Garcetti should be analogous, if 
ever, only to student-athletes’ speech when they appear in uniform at official 
functions, such as postgame news conferences, where speaking to the news media is 
regarded as an expectation of team participation. 
The Garcetti line of employee-speech cases, if faithfully applied by the lower 
courts, should seldom apply to off-duty speech on social-networking pages, since it 
is neither within the scope of an employee’s job duties to create a personal 
Facebook page nor likely that a reasonable reader would mistake a Facebook wall 
post for a government agency’s official policy statement. But lower courts have, at 
times, expansively applied a Garcetti analysis even to off-hours expression, where it 
is alleged that the speaker’s message would bring disrepute to the government 
agency and undermine the agency’s own contrary official message.88 
Deciding that a government employee engaged in legally protected speech is just 
the first step in determining whether an actionable retaliation claim exists. 
 
 83. Id. at 154. 
 84. 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006). 
 85. Id. at 415. 
 86. Id. at 421. 
 87. Id. at 421–22. 
 88. See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of its Workers’ Speech to 
Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 (October 2009) (“[C]ourts increasingly hold that the government 
may also control even its workers’ off-duty speech to protect its own expressive interests.”); see also id. at 18–20 
nn.62–69 and accompanying text (citing a sting of circuit court rulings affirming, in reliance on the off-duty 
speech doctrine, the firing of law enforcement officers who engaged in racially or sexually offensive speech 
during their off-hours, even where nothing about the speech identified the speaker’s employment affiliation). 
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Assuming that the employee spoke on a matter of public concern (Connick)89 and 
that the speech was beyond the scope of her job responsibilities (Garcetti),90 the 
question then becomes whether the employee experienced a deprivation causally 
connected to her message that courts are prepared to recognize as retaliatory. 
For many years, plaintiffs who experienced government reprisals for speech were 
thwarted in recovering under a First Amendment theory unless they could 
demonstrate that the retaliatory action deprived them of a benefit to which they had 
a vested constitutional entitlement. The “rights/privileges doctrine” sprouted from 
Justice Holmes’ glib pronouncement in an 1892 case, McAuliffe v. City of New 
Bedford, that a citizen “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.”91 The doctrine proved fatal to generations of 
claims by public employees forced to check their constitutional rights at the 
entryway.92 When New York schoolteachers challenged a 1950s anti-Communist 
statute forbidding membership in anti-American groups, the Supreme Court 
reached back to McAuliffe and declared that employees “have no right to work for 
the State in the school system on their own terms.”93 That changed with the 
Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents—challenging, this 
time at a state university, the same New York anti-Communist law upheld in 
Adler.94 In Keyishian, the Court finally renounced formalistic reliance on “rights” 
versus “privileges” for purposes of a constitutional claim, holding that—even if a 
government agency has discretion to award or withhold a benefit—it may not do so 
for a retaliatory purpose to deter the exercise of constitutional rights.95 
Subsequently, the Court famously declared that even so ephemeral a slight as the 
cancellation of an office birthday party could, if meant to inhibit constitutionally 
protected speech, give rise to a First Amendment claim.96 
Outside of the public employment context, the federal courts have clearly 
recognized that any government response to speech may be unlawfully retaliatory if 
it “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 
 
 89. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
 90. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. 
 91. 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 92. See infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
 93. Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (citing United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 
330 U.S. 75 (1947)).  
 94. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 95. Id. at 605–06. 
 96. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943, 954 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
497 U.S. 62, 75 n.8 (1990). Widely discounted as dicta, the “birthday party” level of materiality for a retaliation 
claim was borrowed directly from the Seventh Circuit opinion. See, e.g., Pierce v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 
37 F.3d 1146, 1150 n.1 (5th Cir. 1994) (“We choose not to read the Supreme Court’s dicta literally; rather, we 
apply the main analysis of Rutan to retaliation claims and require more than a trivial act to establish 
constitutional harm.”). 
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Amendment activities.”97 But courts have had more difficulty locating the proper 
standard when a public employee brings a retaliation claim against her employer. In 
some judicial circuits, public employees claiming they were punished for 
constitutionally protected speech have been forced to prove they suffered a 
materially adverse change in the terms of their employment, such as firing or 
demotion to a lower-paying job.98  Other circuits have been more hospitable, 
recognizing that state action short of an adverse employment decision could 
“silence a person of ordinary firmness.”99 At least some of the confusion resulted 
from decades of uncertainty over the threshold for bringing a retaliation claim 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal employment 
discrimination statute.100 Because First Amendment retaliation claims so often 
coexist with statutory claims as part of Title VII litigation, courts have been perhaps 
understandably tempted to apply comparable standards to the two causes of 
action.101 
While it has long been recognized that employers may not retaliate against either 
a victim of discrimination or just a concerned bystander who takes part in a Title 
VII complaint, for decades courts were divided over the standard for what 
constitutes actionable retaliation.102 In the view of some courts, only a tangibly 
adverse (or “ultimate”) employment action—a change in pay or rank, or a 
suspension or removal from employment—could support a statutory claim of 
retaliation.103 Others were more lenient, recognizing that a retaliation claim could lie 
 
 97. See, e.g., Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the 
“ordinary firmness” standard to First Amendment suit by environmental activists who claimed police falsely 
arrested them in retaliation for past protest activity) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 98. See Meyers v. Starke, 420 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 991 
(8th Cir. 2002)); DeGuiseppe v. Vill. of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 191 (7th Cir. 1995); Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1149; 
Elizabeth J. Bohn, Put on Your Coat, a Chill Wind Blows: Embracing the Expansion of the Adverse Employment 
Action Factor in Tenth Circuit First Amendment Retaliation Claims, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 867, 871–75 (2006) 
(categorizing courts’ approaches as either engrafting the Title VII standard onto a First Amendment retaliation 
claim, demanding that the plaintiff prove she suffered action “that would deter a similarly situated individual of 
ordinary firmness” from speaking, or requiring only that the plaintiff show a detrimental action—even a slight 
one—that impermissibly chilled speech). 
 99. Bohn, supra note 98 at 873–74 (citation omitted). For examples of Circuit Courts of Appeals utilizing 
the “person of ordinary firmness standard, see Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. Of Tech., 464 F.3d 217, 225 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Washington v. Cnty. of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 320 (2d Cir. 2004); Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 
F.3d 923, 927–28 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2001); Suppan v. 
Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000); Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(citing Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 101. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Superimposing Title VII’s Adverse Action Requirement on First Amendment 
Retaliation Claims: A Chilling Prospect for Government Employee Speech, 79 TUL. L. REV. 669, 686–87 (2005) 
(noting that appellate courts started using Title VII jurisprudence to block First Amendment violation claims 
brought by government employees). 
 102. For a brief discussion on the circuit split regarding retaliator actions in the workplace, see Burlington 
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60–61 (2006) [hereinafter Burlington Northern]. 
 103. Id. at 60. 
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even where the change in employment conditions was more subtle, such as an 
assignment to less-desirable duties.104 
In 2006, the Supreme Court settled the matter. In Burlington Northern & Santa 
Fe Railway Co. v. White, a female forklift operator contended that she was assigned 
to more strenuous and less prestigious laborer duties after lodging a claim of 
unlawful sex discrimination.105 The Court found the claim actionable, ruled that an 
employee need only show a materially adverse action—not necessarily one that 
changes the financial conditions of employment—to prevail on a statutory 
retaliation claim.106 Significantly, the retaliatory action need not even be strictly 
employment-related, so long as it is sufficiently severe that it might dissuade a 
reasonable employee from lodging or supporting a discrimination claim.107 Few 
published cases since Burlington Northern address whether the Court’s modification 
of the Title VII retaliation standard necessarily also alters the threshold for bringing 
a First Amendment retaliation case.108 But it would be counterintuitive in light of 
the Supreme Court’s guidance in Rutan to require more demanding proof of 
retaliation to sustain a First Amendment claim. 
Mirroring the discussion on campus, one of the most actively contested issues 
involving employee speech today involves the extent to which employers may 
regulate or punish speech taking place entirely outside the workplace setting. In the 
public employment context where First Amendment interests are implicated, the 
first round of “Internet era” rulings has been decidedly mixed. Some rulings 
uncritically accept that, because government workers’ off-hours blogging and 
tweeting can damage their effectiveness at work, the Garcetti level of employer 
 
 104. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 2000) (defining adverse 
employment action “broadly” to include the elimination of an employee program, elimination of “the flexible 
start-time policy,” the “institut[ution of] lockdown procedures,” and reduced workload and pay); Aviles v. 
Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 606 (7th Cir. 1999) (filing a false police report about the employee qualifies as 
adverse employment action); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc., 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (employer’s 
cancellation of symposium honoring employee may be “adverse employment action”).  
 105. Burlington Northern, supra note 102, at 58–59. 
 106. Id. (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (finding that a retaliatory act is 
actionable under Title VII if “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, 
‘which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination’”). 
 107. Id.; see also J. Gregory Grisham & Frank L. Day, Title VII Retaliation Claims After White: The Struggle to 
Define Materially Adverse Conduct in the Context of the Reasonable Employee Standard, 10 J. ENGAGE 80, 81–83 
(February 2009) (discussing range of retaliatory actions—including, in one instance, complicity in setting the 
complaining employee’s car on fire—that courts have, post-White, found capable of qualifying as materially 
adverse). 
 108. For instance, in the post-White case of Worley v. City of Lilburn, the Eleventh Circuit cited the White 
standard in the context of assessing an employee’s Title VII claim, but then reverted to the pre-White 
formulation – requiring an “important” change in a term of employment – to sustain the employee’s 
accompanying First Amendment retaliation claim. See Worley, 408 Fed. App’x. 248, 250–52 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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control follows them home.109 Others are more protective of public employees’ 
ability to speak unguardedly off the clock.110 Even in the private workplace, the legal 
system is slowly adapting to the reality that the small-group watercooler 
conversations of earlier generations are increasingly taking place on widely viewable 
social networking pages.111 
III. CONTROLLING STUDENTS’ SPEECH IN THE EXTRACURRICULAR 
SETTING 
A. “The Dark Ages”: Athlete Speech Rights Before Facebook 
Colleges’ interests in enforcing conformity and to preserving a favorable public 
image have always created friction with athletes’ interests in freedom of expression. 
Even so, student athletes have prevailed on First Amendment claims—even when 
speaking within the school setting—where courts recognized their speech as 
societally valuable and where the speech did not cross the line into defiant behavior. 
In Pinard v. Clatskanie School District 6J, high school basketball players in 
Oregon delivered a joint petition to their coach asking for his resignation, alleging a 
pattern of “incessant yelling, profanity and abusive coaching tactics.”112 When their 
principal learned of the petition, he called a team meeting with the athletic director, 
where the athletes elaborated on their grievances.113 Because the coach was not 
immediately fired, all but one of the players elected to skip the team’s next game.114 
The next day, players testified, the principal “permanently suspended” all of the 
petition-signers from the team (though the principal claimed only those who 
boycotted the game were suspended).115 The students alleged that removal from the 
 
 109. See, e.g., Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution, 631 F. Supp. 2d 564, 576–77, 581–82 (M.D. Pa. 2009) 
(finding employer’s actions were non-retaliatory when employee’s blog raised public concern about potential 
bias that would conflict with her duties, and potential efficiency problems for her department). 
 110. See, e.g., In re Rubino v. City of N.Y., 965 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (App. Div. 2013) (reversing, as “shocking to 
one’s sense of fairness,” the firing of a teacher who joked on Facebook about wishing unruly students would 
drown, in light of the teacher’s clean disciplinary record and “her expression that she would never do something 
like this again”). 
 111. The National Labor Relations Board, which regulates only private employers, recently has signaled that 
punishing workers for complaining about their workplaces on social media might constitute a sanctionably 
unfair labor practice, if the employee’s speech can be understood as summoning fellow workers to organize to 
improve working conditions. See Amy L. Rosenberger, Early Lessons from the NLRB on Social Media, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER (May 15, 2013 12:00AM), http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202598466318& 
Early_Lessons_From_the_NLRB_on_Social_Media (describing NLRB findings that employers violated 
National Labor Relations Act by penalizing employees for using social media to engage in “concerted activities” 
for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection”). 
 112. 467 F.3d 755, 760 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 113. Id. at 761. 
 114. Id. at 762. 
 115. Id. 
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team violated their First Amendment rights.116 The Ninth Circuit agreed that, to the 
extent that the removal was based on having signed the petition or voiced criticism 
in the principal’s meeting, it was unlawful.117 Applying Tinker—and rejecting the 
school’s invitation to instead apply the Connick “public concern” standard that 
governs employee speech—the court held that the players’ speech, presented in a 
private setting to a small audience, could not reasonably have been expected to 
produce a disruption.118 
Pinard relied on a Tenth Circuit ruling, Seamons v. Snow,119 where an athlete’s 
complaints about a coach’s behavior were likewise held to constitute protected 
speech. The case involved a high school football player who complained to school 
authorities after teammates beat him up in the locker room.120 The player said the 
head football coach demanded that he apologize to the team for blowing the whistle 
on the hazing; when he refused, he was removed from the squad.121 The Tenth 
Circuit found the coach’s behavior actionable under the Tinker standard, reasoning 
that coaches may not punish “peaceful speech” that does not create substantial 
disorder, materially disrupt class work, or invade the rights of others.122 
Other rulings, however, place a relatively higher premium on team unity, 
emphasizing that athletes voluntarily surrender a degree of freedom in exchange for 
the privilege of playing sports. In these cases, courts are inclined to “define down” 
what it means to substantially disrupt school operations, so that merely interfering 
with team cohesion removes speech from the protection of Tinker.123 These cases, 
either explicitly or implicitly, liken the student-school relationship to the employee-
employer relationship so that complaints about “working conditions” within the 
athletic program will be viewed as mere personal gripes unworthy of constitutional 
recognition.124 
Most prominent among these is the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Lowery v. Euverard, 
a case involving a high school football team’s revolt against a coach they found 
unbearable to play for.125 In Lowery, students at a Tennessee high school circulated a 
petition seeking the removal of their head football coach, Marty Euverard, alleging 
that the coach “struck a player in the helmet, threw away college recruiting letters to 
 
 116. Id. at 763. 
 117. Id. at 764. 
 118. Id. at 766–70. 
 119. 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 120. Id. at 1230. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1237–38. 
 123. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding the school administration’s response 
to a student petition reasonable because of the potential disruption to team unity if the coaches had not acted). 
 124. See id. at 596–97 (explicit comparison of student athletes to government employees); Marcum v. Dahl, 
658 F.2d 731, 734–35 (10th Cir. 1981) (implicit comparison of student athletes to government employees by 
applying Pickering and government employee analysis). 
 125. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585–86 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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disfavored players, humiliated and degraded players, used inappropriate language, 
and required a year-round conditioning program in violation of high school 
rules.”126 When the coach learned of the petition, he summoned the players and 
coaching staff for a meeting, and took each player aside individually for 
questioning.127 Four players jointly walked out of the interrogation and were kicked 
off the team. They claimed their removal violated the First Amendment, but the 
Sixth Circuit disagreed.128 
The Sixth Circuit focused on the unique setting of an athletic program, where 
individual agendas must be subordinated to the collective goal of winning games, a 
goal to which the coach’s authority is crucial.129 Because the petition threatened to 
stir locker-room disharmony and undermine the coach’s authority, the school 
reasonably anticipated substantial disruption to the football team, the judges held.130 
Analogizing the football field to the workplace, the court emphasized that students 
voluntarily accept limits on their freedom as part of the bargain when they seek a 
“job” with the team.131 
Concurring in the result, Judge Ronald Lee Gilman said the school did violate 
the athletes’ constitutional rights, but that the right was not clearly established so as 
to overcome the coach’s entitlement to qualified immunity from damages.132 On the 
merits, Judge Gilman disagreed with the majority’s relaxed application of Tinker in 
the locker-room setting: “[A] student-athlete does not, as suggested by the lead 
opinion, enjoy fewer First Amendment rights under Tinker because of his or her 
choice to participate in high school athletics.”133 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit found no First Amendment violation when an Iowa 
high school kicked a player off the basketball team for distributing a letter to her 
teammates that used profanity to criticize their coach.134 Frustrated when the coach 
refused to promote her to the varsity squad, the player urged her teammates to 
“give [the coach] back some of the bullshit that he has given us.”135 While not 
explicitly using the Connick “public concern” formulation, the court emphasized 
that the player’s complaints lacked any element of whistleblowing and were instead 
in the nature of personal grievances, which she presented in a disrespectful manner 
that the school reasonably believed might disrupt the basketball program.136 
 
 126. Id. at 585. 
 127. Id. at 586. 
 128. Id. at 600–01. 
 129. Id. at 594–96. 
 130. Id. at 600–01. 
 131. Id. at 596–97. 
 132. Id. at 606 (Gilman, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. at 605. 
 134. Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 769 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 135. Id. at 769–70. 
 136. Id. at 772. 
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The same rationale—that comments critical of coaches will prompt disunity 
among players and undermine the successful pursuit of team goals – was behind the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Marcum v. Dahl dismissing the First Amendment claims 
of college basketball players who lost their athletic scholarships after criticizing their 
head coach both privately and in the news media.137 The players in Dahl first voiced 
concerns to their athletic director about the coach’s “lifestyle” and about what they 
perceived as favoritism, and when the college took no action, told the press they 
would no longer play for the coach.138 The athletic director for women’s sports told 
each of the complainers that their scholarships would be discontinued because of 
their “attitude[s] and behavior.”139 Despite the undisputed cause-and-effect, the 
Tenth Circuit, relying in part on Pickering, found no First Amendment violation, as 
the players’ complaints were “not of general public concern” and “resulted in 
disharmony among the players and disrupted the effective administration of the 
basketball program.”140 
As seen in these cases, whether students have First Amendment recourse when 
removed from athletic participation is an intently fact-specific determination that 
often turns on two factors—first, a court’s determination that an athlete’s behavior 
has crossed the line from defiant speech into an intent to behave defiantly (such as 
by boycotting games), and second, the relative importance that a court places on 
the harmonious operation of the athletic program as compared with the interests of 
the speaker in “rocking the boat.” 
B. “Trash-Tweeting”: School Authority Follows Athletes Online 
Last week my wife and I told our 13-year-old daughter she could join 
Facebook. Within a few hours she had accumulated 171 friends, and I felt a 
little as if I had passed my child a pipe of crystal meth.141 
Then the executive editor of The New York Times, Bill Keller ignited a brief social-
media firestorm with a 32-character grenade written on his Twitter account: 
“#TwitterMakesYouStupid. Discuss.”142 Technophiles responded predictably: “Some 
people sound stupid off Twitter too. Perhaps the problem isn’t Twitter,” was one of 
the politer retorts.143 Unrepentant, Keller took to the pages of the Times with a 
 
 137. 658 F.2d 731, 734 (10th Cir. 1981). 
 138. Id. at 733. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 734–35. 
 141. Bill Keller, The Twitter Trap, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2011 (Magazine), at 11. 
 142. Id. at 12. 
 143. Mike Masnick, NY Times Editor Claims Twitter Killing Conversation, While His Tweets Spawn 
Conversation, TECHDIRT (May 18, 2011, 3:39 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110518/11213214321/ 
ny-times-editor-claims-twitter-killing-conversation-while-his-tweets-spawn-conversation.shtml. 
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cautionary lecture about the powerful hold of social media on the American 
conscious and how it may be subtly changing the way people use their brains: 
“Twitter is not just an ambient presence. It demands attention and response. It is 
the enemy of contemplation.”144 
Twitter may not make anyone stupid, but its frictionless immediacy invites 
widespread sharing of momentarily blurted thoughts. The failed joke that once fell 
flat on the locker-room floor instead sits memorialized on public display, where it is 
scrutinized and second-guessed. Because so many athletes have successfully built a 
social media following to interact with fans, the audience for their electronic 
updates can (for the highest-profile professionals) reach into the millions.145 While 
it is rare for a college athlete to command such a following, mainstream news 
outlets have in recent years begun routinely quoting social-media updates as if the 
 accountholder were speaking directly, thus amplifying the impact of a gaffe.146 
By way of background, Facebook is the most popular of the websites broadly 
regarded as “social networking” sites, enabling users to share links to online 
content, post observations on a personal “wall” and upload photographs.147 Privacy 
settings on the site allow the account-holder to tailor the permissible viewership of 
each item shared, from publicly viewable by anyone using Facebook down to an 
 approved list of enumerated “friends.”148 Twitter is referred to as a “microblogging” 
site, providing a free conduit through which users may share comments, photos and 
links to websites in posts capped at 140 characters.149 Accountholders may make 
 
 144. Keller, supra note 141, at 12. 
 145. See, e.g., Alvin Anol & Marvin Pittman, LeBron James’ Twitter Account is Rocketing Up In Numbers, 
ESPN (July 7, 2010, 12:20 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/page2/index?id=5360881 (listing the most followed 
athletes on Twitter). 
 146. Even national-affairs reporters at respected media outlets have taken to incorporating Twitter posts 
into their news coverage. See, e.g., Juan Forero, Venezuela’s Maduro Culls Power with Snowden Asylum Offer, 
WASH. POST, July 29, 2013 at A7 (republishing a remark from Russian parliament member Alexi Pushkov’s 
Twitter account); Hiroko Tabuchi, Ban Lifted, Japan’s Politicians Race Online, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2013, at A4 
(quoting an opposition-party candidate’s tweet introducing himself to the Japanese electorate). Quotes culled 
from Twitter have become a staple of the news media’s coverage of sporting events and of celebrity deaths as 
well. See, e.g., Jeff Barker, In Leaving Behind ACC, UM Hopes It Can Finally Catch Up In Big Ten, BALT. SUN, 
June 25, 2013, at 1C (quoting NBA star LeBron James’ Twitter reaction after seeing redesigned University of 
Maryland football uniforms: “OH GOSH! Maryland uniforms #Ewwwww!”); Whitney Houston Dead at 48; 
Celebs React on Twitter, L.A. TIMES BLOG, (Feb. 11, 2012, 6:14 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/gossip/ 
2012/02/whitney-houston-dead.html (quoting tweets from celebrities including Russell Simmons, Justin Bieber, 
and Michelle Branch, expressing sorrow at Houston’s death). 
 147. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 331 (Nygaard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting Facebook’s extreme popularity based on the site’s registered user base of over 500 million people). 
 148. Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK HELP CTR. (2013), https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
325807937506242 (describing Facebook’s privacy features and explaining how to utilize them). 
 149. See Chris Gaylord, A Primer on Twitter, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, March 26, 2009, at 25 
(explaining the vocabulary of “hashtags” and “retweets” as popularized by users of the service); Annie Cercone, 
Fifth Anniversary of Social Phenomenon: Bloggers Still Composing a Story of Tweet Success, 140 Characters at a 
Time, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 21, 2011, at 1D (reporting how Twitter grew to 200 million individual 
accounts over five years). 
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their postings publicly viewable or may “protect” their accounts by enabling only 
pre-approved “subscribers” to see what they write.150 Significantly, Facebook and 
Twitter each have one-to-one messaging capability that is the functional equivalent 
of email, and both Facebook and its Google-backed would-be competitor, Google+, 
have “chat” features enabling distant accountholders to exchange real-time text 
messages approximating a conversation, and to archive those chats for later 
viewing.151 
While in simpler times a coach or athletic director would never seriously 
contemplate demanding to eavesdrop on a player’s telephone calls, read his mail, or 
sit in on his lunchtime social conversations at the mall, the potentially greater reach 
and durability of electronic communications have changed the game.152 Colleges 
perceive online platforms as amplifying the trouble that an intemperate (or overly 
candid) comment might cause, for the student and for the institution alike. Athletic 
programs have responded to the “Twitter generation” in three main ways: 
(1) By imposing punishment, often in the form of “benching” or demotion, in 
response to particular remarks.153 Punishment sometimes follows statements 
perceived as divisive to the team or defiant of authority. At other times, punishment 
results from speech that offends members of the audience who might think less of 
the athlete (or, administrators fear, of the institution). A typical policy, in force at 
the University of Houston, describes a set of “guidelines” for optimal online 
behavior—some of which track existing First Amendment law, others of which 
seem purely aspirational (“be proud of where you come from and where you are 
at”)—and then concludes with an admonition: “If a student-athlete’s social media 
activity is found to be inappropriate in accordance with this policy, he/she may be 
subject to” penalties up to and including “expulsion from his/her team and/or loss 
of some or all of his/her athletics financial aid.”154 
 
 150. See About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER HELP CTR. (2013), https://support.twitter.com/articles/ 
14016-about-public-and-protected-tweets#. 
 151. See Sending a Message, FACEBOOK HELP CTR. (2013), https://www.facebook.com/help/3265347940985 
01/; Send and Receive Direct Messages, TWITTER HELP CTR. (2013), https://support.twitter.com/groups/50-
welcome-to-twitter/topics/202-take-a-tour/articles/20169555-send-and-receive-direct-messages#; Hangouts, 
GOOGLE+ FEATURES, http://www.google.com/+/learnmore/hangouts/; Facebook Chat. Everywhere, FACEBOOK 
(2013), https://www.facebook.com/sitetour/chat.php. 
 152. See Bentley, supra note 5, at 834–36 (noting that it would be instantly recognized as an 
unconstitutional and excessive restriction of athletes’ rights to restrict their telephone privileges, allow 
monitoring of their calls for bad language, or bring a coach with them to every party). 
 153. See, e.g., University of Southern California Athletic Department Social Media Policy & Guidelines for 
Student-Athletes, https://saas.usc.edu/files/2012/08/USC-Student-Athlete-Social-Media-Policy-Sign-Off.pdf; 
Online Social Networking Policy, ATHLETIC ACADEMIC SERVICES – NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.northwestern.edu/academicservices/cats-lifeskills/personal-development/online-social-networking-
policy.html. 
 154. Eric Bentley, He Tweeted What? A First Amendment Analysis of the Use of Social Media by College 
Athletes and Recommended Best Practices for Athletic Departments, 38 J.C. & U.L. 451, 476–78 (2012) (University 
of Houston policy is reprinted as an appendix). 
LoMonte PP2 (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2014  2:00 PM 
 Frank D. LoMonte 
Vol. 9, No. 1 2014 25 
(2) By banning or limiting social media activity.155 Coaches have enacted 
categorical bans on Twitter, ordered athletes to abstain from social media during 
the playing season, and imposed temporary social-media “blackouts” in response to 
substandard performance. 
(3) By requiring athletes to surrender their social media passwords, so that either 
an employee of the athletic department or a private monitoring service can follow 
the portions of the athlete’s online activity that are not visible to the general 
public.156 Monitoring companies work with institutions to develop “key word lists” 
of terms that might—in the words of one company’s CEO, “damage the school’s 
brand.”157 A policy that athletes at Utah State University were asked to sign is 
typical: “To the extent that any federal, state or local law prohibits the Athletic 
Department from accessing my social networking accounts, I hereby waive any and 
all such rights and protections.”158 Having access to an account-holder’s login 
information conveys the ability to read “protected” postings that were shared with a 
limited audience (which might be two people or might be 2,000 people) of the 
author’s choosing. It also provides access to one-on-one personal messages archived 
on Facebook and Twitter, and chats archived on Facebook and Google+, 
comparable to being able to read a student’s emails or smartphone text messages. 
Colleges are feeling heightened pressure to watch social media for warning signs 
that their athletes might be involved in illicit behavior. In June 2011, the NCAA 
served notice on the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill that its football 
program was facing stiff penalties for rule violations that, in the view of NCAA 
enforcers, might have been detected sooner by vigilantly reading players’ Twitter 
accounts.159 “In February through June 2010,” the letter reads, “the institution did 
not adequately and consistently monitor social networking activity that visibly 
illustrated potential amateurism violations within the football program, which 
delayed the institution’s discovery and compounded the provision of impermissible 
benefits” totaling more than $27,000 between seven football players.160 In March 
 
 155. See Bentley, supra note 5, at 835–36. 
 156. See Bentley, supra note 5, at 836. 
 157. See John Browning, Universities Monitoring Social Media Accounts of Student Athletes: A Recipe for 
Disaster, 75 TEX. BAR J. 840, 842 (December 2012). See also Nick Glunt, First Amendment Fumble?, STUDENT 
PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT (Spring 2012), http://www.splc.org/news/report_detail.asp?edition=58&id=1629 
(last viewed Aug. 12, 2013) (discussing rising utilization of Varsity Monitor and UDiligence monitoring 
services). 
 158. The policy was excerpted on the blog of a Maryland attorney who advocates in favor of athletes’ social 
media privacy. See Bradley Shear, Utah Bans Student-Athlete Social Media Monitoring Firms, SHEAR ON SOCIAL 
MEDIA LAW (April 9, 2013), http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/2013_04_09_archive.html. 
 159. NCAA Details Allegations in Yearlong Football Probe, UNC GENERAL ALUMNI ASSOCIATION (June 22, 
2011), http://alumni.unc.edu/article.aspx?sid=8300. 
 160. See Glunt, supra note 157 (discussing rising utilization of Varsity Monitor and UDiligence monitoring 
services). 
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2013, the NCAA revoked 15 scholarships and banned the football team from 
postseason play for a year, quoting UNC athletes’ tweets as evidence.161 
C. Legislative Responses 
While the courts have yet to weigh in on the permissible scope of colleges’ intrusion 
into students’ social-media lives, a handful of state legislatures have filled the 
vacuum. Since 2011, legislatures in eight states – Arkansas, California, Delaware, 
Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon and Utah – have enacted “social media 
privacy” statutes limiting the ability of colleges to require current or prospective 
students to surrender private social-media information.162 No litigation has yet 
emerged testing these statutes in the context of college sports. A likely point of 
contention will be whether students may be compelled to sign a waiver similar to 
the aforementioned policy at Utah State forsaking their newfound statutory 
protection as a condition of participating in sports. 
IV. ATHLETE SOCIAL MEDIA RESTRAINTS FLUNK FIRST 
AMENDMENT SCRUTINY 
A. Athlete Social Media Bans Invite Vagueness, Overbreadth Challenge 
If a First Amendment challenge arises to colleges’ social-media restrictions, the 
inquiry will focus on the nature of the speech being restricted and the relative 
importance of the government’s rationale. Since so little speech is categorically 
beyond the scope of the First Amendment, an athlete’s case typically will involve 
constitutionally protected expression. The question then will become whether the 
government has a compelling justification overriding the speaker’s First 
Amendment rights, and whether the restriction is a “fit” well-tailored to the 
problem being addressed. By that yardstick, the initial generation of restrictions on 
college athletes’ social-media activity will be difficult to justify. 
The Supreme Court has shown special solicitude for speech addressing, even 
peripherally and with no great depth or sophistication, issues of political or social 
concern. The Court’s decision in the Snyder case involving Westboro Baptist 
Church turned decisively on the Court’s conclusion that the subjects of the church 
protesters’ hate speech—“the political and moral conduct of the United States and 
its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals 
involving the Catholic clergy”—were matters of public concern.163 In a recent 
 
 161. Andrew Carter, UNC’s Thorp Calls Penalties Painful, NEWS & OBSERVER (March 13, 2012), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/03/12/1926741/ncaa-to-announce-findings-on-unc.html. 
 162. See Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2013, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (July 31, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-
passwords-2013.aspx. 
 163. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216–17 (2011). 
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application of this doctrine in the school setting, the Third Circuit recognized that 
even in-school speech using “lewd” phrases is constitutionally protected if it can be 
understood as addressing an issue of social or political concern.164 Speech 
attempting to shed light on abusive practices by coaches, for instance, would be 
properly regarded as addressing a matter of public concern. Because restrictions on 
athletes’ online speech do not typically make any allowances for speech addressing 
matters of public concern, they run the risk of impermissibly chilling unkind 
remarks about national political figures or impolitic remarks about contemporary  
social issues – exactly the speech for which the Court has always said the First 
Amendment must provide an extra modicum of “breathing space.”165 Punishing 
athletes for the use of taboo “flagged words” invites a special risk of impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination. Athletes who are singled out, for instance, because they 
express anti-gay religious views or views insulting to particular ethnic minorities 
may well have a First Amendment claim if speakers expressing contrary viewpoints 
go unpunished.166 
Banning the use of social media to protect athletes from reading unkind speech 
about them is a singularly unpersuasive justification. The remedy is fatally under-
inclusive, because so many alternative conduits exist.167 Even without a social media 
account, an athlete is exposed to the wrath of sports fans and commentators on talk 
radio, on blogs and news websites (including reader comment boards), and of 
course within the stadium itself. And indeed, one need not hold a Twitter account 
at all to read the content on Twitter that writers make publicly accessible. Unless 
athletic departments also are prepared to ban telephones and email, those with 
 
 164. See B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., No. 11-2067, 2013 WL 3970093, at *11 (3d Cir., Aug. 5, 
2013) (en banc) (applying limiting gloss to Supreme Court’s Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 
(1986), which empowered schools to punish “lewd” student speech in the captive-listener setting of a school 
assembly). 
 165. In striking down a statute that attempted to restrict civil-rights lawyers from placing advertisements 
seeking plaintiffs for race-discrimination test cases, Justice Brennan memorably wrote, “Because First 
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow 
specificity.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 
(1940)). 
 166. See Browning, supra note 157, at 842 (pointing out “troubling words and phrases” for which 
monitoring companies have been asked to flag athletes’ accounts, including “Arab[,]” “Muslim” and “gay”). 
 167. See, e.g., Brown v. Ent’mt Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740 (2011) (finding that a California statute 
making it a crime to sell a child a video game depicting realistic scenes of violence was “wildly underinclusive,” 
because it left unregulated equally graphic violence in other media accessible to children, and because the 
proscription could easily be subverted by having an adult purchase the game). For a thorough discussion of the 
importance of a “fit” between the regulation and the problem sought to be addressed, see Pitt News v. Pappert, 
379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004). In Pappert, then-Judge Alito authored the opinion invalidating, as “both severely 
over-inclusive and under-inclusive,” a Pennsylvania statute banning ads for alcoholic beverages only in media 
affiliated with a college or university. While the prohibition was offered as a response to unlawful drinking by 
underage college students, the court found that justification lacking, both because less speech-restrictive 
alternatives existed (enforcing the law against underage drinking) and because the law disadvantaged one subset 
of news organizations while allowing ads to continue in other media equally accessible to and influential on 
campus audiences. Id. at 108–09. 
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ulterior agendas—sports agents, fixers, boosters—have no shortage of alternative 
ways to communicate with athletes168 (and indeed, given the risk of public exposure, 
social-networking pages would be a relatively unlikely conduit for those bent on 
criminality). Banning social media entirely is also overbroad, in that (a) narrower 
remedies exist, including privacy settings that allow account-holders to refuse to 
accept messages from unknown or unwelcome senders, and (b) voluntarily 
abstaining from social media, for those athletes who are sensitive to criticism.169 
While the doctrine is not well-developed, the Supreme Court has recognized a First 
Amendment right to receive as well as to communicate information.170 Ordering 
even an athlete who is thick-skinned and is unafraid of criticism to abstain, over his 
objections, from taking part in social media would implicate both the right to speak 
and the right to read. 
“Saving the athlete from himself” is the weakest of the justifications that athletic 
departments and their advocates have offered for banning or regulating social 
media activity.171 The idea underlying selectively singling out social media for 
prohibition – that social media is a uniquely effective way to reach a large 
audience—is both self-defeating and beside the point; the First Amendment is not 
volumetric, and a speaker’s right to freedom of expression does not diminish simply 
 
 168. Illicit contact with athletes greatly predates the social media era. See, e.g., Randall Mell, ‘Canes Would 
Consider Prosecution in Agent Tampering, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 1993, at 6C (reporting 
player’s admission that six members of Miami’s 1987 national champion football team took improper cash 
payments from sports agent); Doug Bedell, Blount-led Sports Agency Gave Collegians Money, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, May 23, 1991, at 1B (reporting that eight players on Southern Methodist University’s football squad 
violated NCAA rules by accepting loans from an SMU booster’s sports agency). Indeed, possibly the most 
heralded college football player of the modern era, 1982 Heisman Trophy winner Herschel Walker of the 
University of Georgia, was forced to forfeit his senior season of college eligibility after impulsively signing a pro 
football contract that he unsuccessfully tried to revoke – two decades before the debut of Facebook. See Mark 
Asher & David Remnick, Walker Goes Pro, Signing Record Pact, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1983 (reporting that 
Walker became ineligible to continue playing college football after hiring an agent, who negotiated what was at 
the time a record salary for a professional football player). 
 169. See Bentley, supra note 5, at 838 (predicting that courts will find social media bans, mandatory 
surrender of account information, and monitoring for “offensive” words to be “over-inclusive and burdening 
more speech than is necessary to achieve the athletic department’s interests”). 
 170. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 (remarking that statute restricting sale of violent video games implicated 
minors’ right to receive information and ideas); see also United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 
454, 470 (1995) (finding that a ban on honoraria for government employees “imposes a significant burden on 
the public’s right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said”). 
 171. See Matt Maher, Note, You’ve Got Messages: Modern Technology Recruiting Through Text-Messaging and 
the Intrusiveness of Facebook, 8 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 125, 139 (providing that some institutions banned 
athletes from social media websites, such as Facebook, because the athletic programs feel as those student-
athletes may not know the risks themselves); Catherine Ho, Companies Tracking College Athletes’ Tweets, 
Facebook Posts Go After Local Universities, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 
2011-10-16/business/35276774_1_udiligence-social-media-student-athletes (quoting Kevin Long, founder of 
UDiligence, as saying that the purpose of athletic programs checking on their athletes’ social media presence is 
“helping the athletes protect their reputation in the long term”). 
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because the speaker is effective at attracting a large readership.172 The proposition 
that a citizen could be prevented from speaking so as not to embarrass himself and 
damage his reputation would be a breathtakingly paternalistic view of the 
government’s regulatory authority. An athlete is no more likely to post career-
damaging material on social media than is, for instance, a law student or journalism 
student who posts material that is plagiarized, that displays prejudice, or that 
violates professional ethics, yet no university would seriously entertain a 
campuswide ban on social media as a means of preserving its students’ career 
prospects.173 Indeed, given the exceedingly small number of student athletes who 
will ever have professional sports careers in which their “brand” is of serious 
financial value—and that superior ability to catch touchdown passes or make 
tackles will still make even the most inept social-media user employable174 – athletes 
may be less in need of “saving” than are non-athletes. 
Athletic departments predictably will attempt to defend curbing social media use 
as part of legitimate “time, place and manner” restrictions. But the doctrine of 
“time, place and manner” is best understood as pertaining to a speaker’s use of 
government property, not the use of a privately owned platform accessed on a 
personal electronic device.175 The Supreme Court developed the concept of 
permissible content-neutral restrictions on the time, place and manner of speech as 
an adjunct of the forum doctrine, which provides for a sliding scale of First 
Amendment protections depending on the nature and historical use of a piece of 
government property. The Supreme Court typically has applied the 
time/place/manner to government regulation of speech on public streets, in 
municipal airports and in public parks—not to a prohibition governing expression 
 
 172. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010) (striking down a 
municipal ordinance with the purpose and effect of banning all tattooing businesses from the city: “In light of 
the long line of cases in which the Supreme Court has invalidated total bans on a medium of communication, it 
cannot be true that any medium of communication may be banned based on the reasoning that it is merely a 
‘more effective’ means of communicating a message”). 
 173. The most infamous of collegiate “social media self-immolations” was the work of a non-athlete 
undergraduate at the University of California, Los Angeles, whose rant about Asian students noisily using 
cellphones in the library “went viral” on the YouTube video-sharing platform to the point that she became a 
national laughingstock and was forced to drop out of the university. See Ian Lovett, U.C.L.A. Student’s Video 
Rant Against Asians Fuels Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2011, at A21; Kate Parkinson-Morgan, Alexandra 
Wallace Apologizes, Announces She Will No Longer Attend UCLA, DAILY BRUIN, Mar. 18, 2011, available at 
http://dailybruin.com/2011/03/18/alexandra_wallace_apologizes_announces_she_will_no_longer_attend_ucla/. 
 174. Manti Te’o, the former Notre Dame football star and 2012 Heisman Trophy runner-up, who gained 
humiliating national attention for, apparently, having been baited into an online “romance” with a woman who 
did not exist, signed a contract estimated to be worth $5 million with the National Football League’s San Diego 
Chargers despite having been the subject of perhaps the most sensational social-media controversy of all time. 
Lindsay H. Jones, Manti Te’o signs contract with San Diego Chargers, USA TODAY, May 9, 2013.  
 175. Alissa Ardito, Social Media, Administrative Agencies, and the First Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301, 
336–37 (2013) (tracing development of time, place and manner doctrine in conjunction with Supreme Court’s 
development of the forum doctrine). 
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on private property.176 Although on rare occasions courts have elected to use the 
“time, place and manner” construct when evaluating the constitutionality of laws 
that apply beyond public property,177 that standard arguably is insufficiently 
protective, since it demands nothing more than reasonableness. 
Even if the doctrine were to apply, the tight control that athletic departments 
exercise over their athletes’ speech in all settings raises serious questions about 
whether an athlete has reasonable alternatives to social media that provide access to 
a comparable audience. And indeed, it is the unique ability of social media to 
inexpensively reach a geographically diffuse audience that has placed the medium in 
the crosshairs of regulators. For example, it is commonplace for athletic 
departments to require athletes to get approval from the athletic department before 
speaking to a news organization, and to ban media outlets from interviewing first-
year players.178 If a player who is concerned about abusive conditions in the athletic 
program is neither allowed to use social media nor to speak directly to the news 
media, the athlete has no reasonably available method of speaking to a national 
audience.179 Restrictions will be more easily defensible if they apply at limited times 
 
 176. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (bandshell in public park); Clark v. Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (public park); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (state fair). The earliest apparent reference to the doctrine of “time, place 
and manner” in Supreme Court jurisprudence occurs in Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 
(1941), a case about a municipal permitting system for parades on public streets. 
 177. See, e.g., City of Painesville Bldg. Dept. v. Dworken & Bernstein Co., 733 N.E.3d 1152, 1154 (Ohio 
2000) (stating, in considering a First Amendment challenge to a city sign ordinance, “a narrowly drawn 
municipal ordinance imposing reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the display of temporary 
signs, including political yard signs posted on private property, could constitutionally be enacted”). 
 178. The handbook given to athletes at Pennsylvania’s East Stroudsburg University is typical: “Student-
athletes are not permitted to speak to the media without prior approval from the ESU Sports Information 
Director, Head Coach or Director of Athletics.” Manual, East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania Athletics, 
2013/2014 Handbook, http://www.esuwarriors.com/custompages/General/2013-14%20Student-Athlete%20 
Planner.pdf?&tab=3. See also Scott Sloan, UK Basketball Locks Out Student Newspaper, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER (Aug. 30, 2011), available at http://www.kentucky.com/2011/08/30/1862265/uk-athletics-student-
newspaper.html (describing how the University of Kentucky’s sports-information office retaliated against the 
school’s student newspaper after a sportswriter “broke the university’s unwritten policy barring media from 
interviewing student-athletes” without approval from the athletic department). 
 179. Athletic departments’ ability to ration media access to athletes has been cited by analogy as a 
justification for similarly rationing athletes’ ability to communicate on social media. See Meg Penrose, 
Outspoken: Social Media and the Modern College Athlete, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 539–40 
(2013) (arguing that media-access restrictions are justified on the rationale of “protect[ing] athletes from 
themselves” because of “the athlete’s alleged unpreparedness to answer questions posed by reporters”). But this 
analogy is of limited usefulness. Athletic departments do not purport to restrict the ability of athletes to 
comment on non-sports-related matters that they encounter in their off-hours (for instance, giving an interview 
about having witnessed a fire or a plane crash), and if they did so, such a restriction almost certainly would be 
struck down as overbroad, just as such restrictions routinely have been invalidated in the setting of public 
employees. See, e.g., Abad v. City of Marathon, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (fire department rule 
requiring prior approval of contact with media was unconstitutionally applied to firefighter and union officer 
who wrote a newspaper column critical of understaffing and low wages); Salerno v. O’Rourke, 555 F. Supp. 750 
(D.N.J. 1983) (regulation against jail employees giving “information” to media representatives or “any other 
person” without the consent of the sheriff is so over-inclusive as to be facially unconstitutional). 
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(perhaps during and immediately before games) and if they leave other online 
conduits open for uncensored use. Twitter has been singled out by athletic 
departments as a special concern, perhaps because its default setting is to make the 
writer’s posts publicly accessible, while Facebook’s is to make the posts accessible 
only to a circle of pre-approved “friends.” If athletes are banned from just one 
social-media site, then the restriction may pass scrutiny as reasonable – though even 
there, the consolidation of social media and mainstream media are making it 
increasingly difficult for someone without a Twitter or Facebook account to be 
heard. For example, online newspapers increasingly are forbidding members of the 
public from posting comments to their websites without logging in by way of a  
Facebook account, hoping to discourage some of the noxious verbal abuse 
associated with anonymous commenting.180 
To defend encroaching into athletes’ online lives, colleges may argue that they 
need extraordinary authority because of the unique regulatory environment 
governing college athletics. Although the NCAA does not require member 
institutions to monitor social media,181 colleges may “defensively” seek such 
authority after such cautionary experiences as the NCAA penalties levied against the 
University of North Carolina, which referenced the university’s failure to detect 
misconduct that was apparent from athletes’ social-media postings.182 While a more 
sympathetic argument than “image control,” this justification too is unlikely to 
prove adequate to override a student’s constitutional interests. Participation in the 
NCAA is voluntary. A government cannot enter into a voluntary agreement to give 
its citizens fewer rights than the Constitution guarantees.183 Moreover, the NCAA’s 
public rebuke to North Carolina referred only to information publicly available on 
athletes’ social networking sites. The NCAA has not held any college responsible for 
policing the non-public portions of athletes’ social media sites, so pressure to 
comply with NCAA directives cannot legitimize otherwise impermissible incursions 
into privacy and free expression. 
 
 180. See David Brauer, Facebook Registration: Mandatory For Newspaper Commenting?, MINNPOST, (Jan. 14, 
2011), http://www.minnpost.com/braublog/2011/01/facebook-registration-mandatory-newspaper-commenting 
(reporting on MediaNews Group’s move to adopt Facebook as gatekeeper for sharing comments on news 
websites, and predicting further expansion among media companies). 
 181. Ray Fittipaldo, “Social Conflicts: Twitter, Facebook and Free-Speech Rights Make Strange Bedfellows 
with Pro Teams and College Athletics,” The Pittsburgh Post, May 16, 2011 at D1 (“Unlike pro sports leagues, 
the NCAA has no official policy for social media for student-athletes. The NCAA leaves it up to its member 
institutions on how they wish to deal with Twitter and Facebook problems.”).  
 182. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NCAA Public Infractions Report (Mar. 12, 2012), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/pdfs/2012/university+of+north+carolina,+chapel+hill+pu
blic+infractions+report+march+12,+2012. 
 183. See generally Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 299–300 (2007) 
(observing that, while member schools in an athletic association may be required to accept certain limitations 
on recruitment tactics, the association can constitutionally enforce “only those conditions on such speech that 
are necessary to managing an efficient and effective state-sponsored high school athletic league”). 
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B. Tinker, Morse and Off-Campus Extracurricular Speech 
If analyzed under the existing framework applicable to student First Amendment 
rights, the bulk of colleges’ first-generation responses to unwelcome speech on  
social media will flunk constitutional scrutiny. Even assuming that Tinker applies,184 
it does not legitimize the breadth of regulatory and punitive authority that colleges 
have assumed. 
Tinker proscribes content-based restrictions on speech unless the speech 
portends substantial disruption of classwork or discipline.185 The meaning of 
“substantial disruption” has proven somewhat elastic. Although it is clear that 
substantial disruption means something beyond hurt feelings and sharp differences 
of opinion, some especially deferential applications of Tinker have reconceived the 
concept of “disruption” to include disturbing a school extracurricular event,186 or 
causing a school to consume substantial time responding to a controversy that the 
student provokes.187 In no event, however, should Tinker be a vehicle for punishing 
even sharply worded speech about political or social issues, or speech that merely 
indicates questionable judgment. Even presuming that colleges have the latitude 
recognized under Tinker, their punitive authority extends only to speech that 
impedes the school from functioning in an operational sense, not speech reflecting 
discredit on the school or its students. 
In the non-digital world, no First Amendment precedent is closely analogous to 
a rule requiring athletes to submit to monitoring of their private social-media 
communications. If reviewed under Tinker, a First Amendment challenge would 
likely turn not on the existence of the monitoring, but on the scope of the punitive 
authority to which the athlete is asked to accede. A mandatory monitoring policy 
will be most defensible if the scope of the college’s ability to punish is limited to 
unlawful or “substantially disruptive” speech. Since the first generation of 
monitoring has not confined itself to speech unprotected under the Tinker 
standard—for instance, policing the mere use of sexual terms, or references to 
alcohol even by people old enough to drink188—the requirement of surrendering 
social-media login information will be constitutionally suspect. Moreover, as a 
 
 184. Despite its increasing incursion into the college setting, Hazelwood should not be seriously entertained 
as the legal standard for speech that an athlete sends and receives on off-campus social media. Hazelwood is a 
creature of forum doctrine that applies when a student seeks to utilize government property to communicate, 
not when a student uses a privately owned website. Moreover, no reasonable reader mistakes a posting on a 
student’s personal social-media page for speech on behalf of, or approved by, the institution. See Helen Norton, 
Imaginary Threats to Government’s Expressive Interests, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1265, 1282 (2011) (“[T]he 
deferential Hazelwood rule first requires a determination that reasonable onlookers will likely misattribute the 
student’s speech to the school.”). 
 185. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
 186. Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 187. Doninger v Niehoff (Doninger II), 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 188. See Ho, supra note 171 (reporting that mentions of drinking games or brands of alcohol are among 
keywords red-flagged by monitoring software popular among college athletic departments). 
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practical matter it will be difficult for colleges to argue that they need access to the 
nonpublic portions of an athlete’s social-media account to detect or prevent 
substantially disruptive speech. A disruption will itself bring the previously 
nonpublic speech to light—for instance, an athlete’s “protected” tweet that leads 
readers to believe he intends to commit violence. If nothing publicly discernable 
happens, then by definition no substantial disruption has occurred. And once 
legally unprotected speech has been disseminated so as to trip the “forbidden word” 
sensors, it is too late for preventive action to keep it from being read. Thus, access 
to athletes’ password information would be difficult to justify on a Tinker rationale. 
Because Tinker represents a compromise struck in the context of in-school 
speech during the school day, it almost certainly is an inadequately protective 
standard for college students’ speech in the very different context of off-campus 
expression.189 First, Tinker originated in the unique “captive listening audience” 
setting of a K-12 school, where attendees are involuntarily exposed to messages 
(such as a classmate’s apparel) from which, because of compulsory attendance laws, 
they may be unable to retreat.190 No one is legally compelled to endure prolonged 
exposure to a voluntarily visited Facebook page.191 Second, when a school restricts 
its students’ off-campus communications, it is regulating not just speech directed at 
other students but speech directed to those entirely unconnected with the school 
and in no position to disrupt it. It is a drastic leap to suggest that, by virtue of being 
enrolled in school, a speaker must always limit her speech in off-campus public 
settings—even speech not meant for a student audience—to that which would be 
“safe” on school time.192 Finally, Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard requires 
 
 189. See Steve Varel, Comment, Limits on School Disciplinary Authority Over Online Student Speech, 33 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 423, 463–72 (2013) (asserting that “it is unnecessary to apply Tinker to off-campus speech 
because, with the application of measures that do not suppress off-campus internet speech, the impact of off-
campus internet speech on school activities can be mitigated to the point that it is largely insignificant” and 
advocating narrower standard under which schools may punish speech created off-campus only when its 
creator intentionally re-communicates the speech on school grounds or at a school function). 
 190. See, e.g., DeFoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 338 (6th Cir. 2010) (Rogers, J., concurring) (“[E]xpression of 
racial hostility can be controlled in the public schools even though such expressions are constitutionally 
permitted in newspapers, public parks, and on the street. Public school students cannot simply decide not to go 
to school.”). 
 191. In the “offline” world, the Supreme Court made this point in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 
205, 212 (1975), refusing to uphold an ordinance banning films depicting nudity at drive-in movie theatres 
where passersby, including children, might unwittingly glimpse an unwelcome breast or buttock: “[T]he screen 
of a drive-in theater is not ‘so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure 
to it.’” (quoting Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967)). The principle applies even more strongly in the 
social media setting, as an unsuspecting pedestrian is unlikely to involuntarily encounter a harmful Twitter 
post. 
 192. Analogously, the Supreme Court repeatedly insists that adults’ distribution of and access to literature 
potentially “harmful” to minors may not be abridged on the grounds that some of the material might find its 
way into the hands of children. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (observing, in striking 
down a statute criminalizing the sale of material containing “obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious language,” 
that: “The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit 
for children”). 
LOMONTE PP2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2014  2:00 PM 
 Fouling the First Amendment 
34 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
neither proof of a wrongful intent to disrupt, nor proof that disruption was a 
reasonable response by the listener.193  Speech may be proscribed or punished as 
“substantially disruptive” even if uttered with the most honorable intentions (for 
example, had John and Mary Beth Tinker’s antiwar armbands ignited classmates 
into fistfights during classes). To permit the most irrational and short-tempered 
listener to determine what a speaker may say—not just on school time, but 
anytime—lends the ultimate sanction to the “heckler’s veto.”194 
Colleges commonly argue that they need authority over what their athletes say 
on social media because of concern both for the welfare of the school and for that of 
the individual student. None of these commonly offered justifications is likely to 
overcome a student’s right of free expression, regardless of whether Tinker or 
something more protective than Tinker emerges as the proper mode of analyzing 
restrictions on off-campus speech. 
The rationale of protecting the college from reputational injury195 is unlikely to 
prove persuasive in a First Amendment analysis. To regard preserving a favorable 
image as a compelling governmental interest would open the door to a dangerous 
degree of censorship authority over, for example, investigative journalism that 
accurately depicts the shortcomings of a government agency. Indeed, government 
litigants seldom acknowledge that their desire to suppress speech is motivated by 
concern for good public relations – and on the rare occasion that “image control” 
has been offered up as a justification for censorship, the justification has been found 
wanting. 
In 2002, Utica, Michigan, High School senior Katy Dean researched and wrote a 
news article about a local couple whose lawsuit alleged that exhaust from a school-
bus garage near their home caused the husband’s lung cancer.196 The superintendent 
claimed Dean’s article was inadequately researched and pulled it from the student 
newspaper.197 Dean sued the district, claiming her First Amendment rights were 
 
 193. See, e.g., Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012) (arguing that the focus should be 
on the reasonableness of response, not the intent of the student); Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II), 527 F.3d 
41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that Tinker does not require “actual disruption to justify a restraint on student 
speech”). 
 194. The First Amendment disfavors empowering audience members to exercise a “heckler’s veto” by 
causing a disturbance that forces the cancellation of the speech. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) 
(warning that a federal online indecency statute risked setting up a “heckler’s veto” by which any participant in 
an online chat could shut down the group’s discussion by declaring that his teenage child was watching). 
 195. See Browning, supra note 157, at 840 (quoting spokesman for University of Kentucky athletics, “the 
school’s primary concern is what the public can see, since this impacts the brand of the university and the 
athlete”). This argument has also been adopted by high schools. See Glendale Unified School District Plans to 
Monitor Students on Social Media, ABC 10 NEWS, SAN DIEGO (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://www.10news.com/news/glendale-unified-school-district-plans-to-monitor-students-on-social-media-
online-082713 (“The program aims to protect students from harming themselves.”). 
 196. Dean v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 802–03 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
 197. Id. at 803. 
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violated.198 A U.S. district court found that the school district illegally censored her 
story, opining that, even in school-financed publications at K-12 schools, students 
“must be allowed to publish viewpoints contrary to those of state authorities 
without intervention or censorship by the authorities themselves.”199 While the 
school district put forth multiple rationales for suppressing the story, all but one—
the desire to project a favorable image by downplaying an unflattering news story—
was found to be false.200 The court determined that, even if the paper were regarded 
as a non-public forum and thus subject to the expansive Hazelwood level of school 
control, the result would be the same, because even Hazelwood does not permit 
withholding a factually accurate article based purely on “a difference of opinion 
with its content.”201 
The Dean case is instructive for its recognition that—even in a K-12 school, and 
even in a publication that is (unlike social media) government property used 
primarily for educational purposes—state officials may not censor student 
viewpoints simply because they find the speech disagreeable or because the speech 
portrays the school in an unfavorable light. If a high school student has a 
constitutionally protected right to publish speech critical of her institution even in a 
non-forum school publication, then a college student undoubtedly must have a 
constitutionally protected right to challenge institutional policies when speaking on 
personal time. “Image protection” is consequently a legally insufficient justification 
to override a speaker’s First Amendment rights. 
Since traditional First Amendment doctrine forbids the level of control that 
colleges increasingly are asserting over their athletes’ off-campus speech, colleges 
will have to argue for an exception that overrides generally applicable constitutional 
principles: Either (a) that the unique athlete/college relationship should be analyzed 
as an “employment” relationship with the accompanying diminution in First 
Amendment rights, or (b) that athletes have (explicitly or by implication) waived 
constitutional protection. 
 
 
 
 
 198. Id. at 800. 
 199. Id. at 804. 
 200. Id. at 810–13. The court rejected the following arguments for censorship: privacy concerns; sexual 
“frank talk” and/or suitability for potential audience; fairness, balance, and opportunity to respond; expert 
testimony; timing; experience of journalism instructor; grammar; writing quality; research; bias and prejudice; 
use of pseudonyms; and accuracy. Id. at 810–12. Although the court implied that concerns for “discipline, 
courtesy or respect for authority” could justify suppression, the school district had not “reasonably related” 
removal of the article to those legitimate ends. Id. at 812–13. 
 201. Id. at 813. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“[E]ducators do not 
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”). 
LOMONTE PP2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2014  2:00 PM 
 Fouling the First Amendment 
36 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
 
V. THE EMPLOYEE AND CONTRACT/WAIVER RATIONALES 
A. Student-Athletes as Employees: If the Cleat Doesn’t Fit. . . 
In a withering examination of the financial exploitation of college athletes for The 
Atlantic, the author Taylor Branch traced the popularization of the now-ubiquitous 
term, “student-athlete,” that has become the buzzword of college athletic 
administrators everywhere.202 While perhaps seeming to represent the primacy of 
the classroom (“student”) above the playing field (“athlete”), the term’s origins are 
more ignoble. As Branch writes, the longtime executive director of the NCAA, 
Walter Byers, insisted on using the unwieldy phrase specifically as a defense to the 
workers’ compensation claims of injured athletes.203 In a turning-point victory for 
the NCAA, the widow of a Texas A&M football player who died while competing in 
a game at Colorado was denied spousal benefits afforded to the survivors of 
employees killed on the job.204 Since that time, Branch writes, NCAA member 
institutions have consistently succeeded in taking advantage of their students’ non-
employee status to defend against liability.205 
Because of the exchange of valuable consideration (free tuition, meal plan, 
housing) for personal services, it is superficially tempting to analogize the athlete-
college relationship to the employee-employer relationship. On occasion, courts 
have conflated the two, as a federal district court did in dismissing the retaliation 
claims of a University of Kansas athlete whose speech—challenging the non-
renewal of his athletic scholarship—was deemed a constitutionally unprotected 
private grievance, pursuant to Connick.206 But students and athletes are materially 
differently situated in fact and in law—as colleges readily recognize when the 
distinction works to their benefit. 
While it is colloquially popular for schools and colleges to admonish students 
that they “represent the school,” that is a colloquialism and not a matter of legal 
fact. Schools do not speak through their students, nor invest their students with 
agency to make representations of legal significance binding on the institution. As 
the First Circuit explained in dismissing a lawsuit attempting to hold a municipal 
school district responsible for decisions made by editors of a high school 
newspaper, students are not a school’s representatives; they are its customers: 
 
 202. Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, at 80, 88–89. 
 203. Id. at 88. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 88–89. 
 206. See Richard v. Perkins, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1217 (D. Kan. 2005) (finding that a student athlete’s First 
Amendment retaliation claim is governed by Connick, which protects speech only if it addresses matters of 
public concern). 
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“Persons do not become state actors because they are clients of government 
services, whether they are students, hospital patients, or prison inmates.”207 Schools 
have, in fact, regularly benefited from this layer of separation. For instance, when a 
California school was accused of violating a federal privacy statute that requires 
schools to safeguard the confidentiality of student records, the school successfully 
defended itself by establishing that a student is not a “person acting for” the 
school.208 Likewise, at the college level, courts have consistently absolved public 
institutions of liability for defamatory material written by students working in 
campus media, because the colleges are constitutionally estopped from controlling 
what their students write.209 
Assuming responsibility for students’ off-campus behavior is an undertaking 
fraught with needless institutional risk. While schools and colleges have been 
successful in deflecting legal liability for torts committed by their students while off 
campus, an exception exists where the agency “undertakes” to supervise the off-
campus activity but does so negligently.210 Deepening the institution’s role in 
policing students’ off-hours behavior may invite liability where the law normally 
assigns none.211 For example, the knowledge that an athlete was sending multiple 
 
 207. Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 253 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 208. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 433 (2002) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1232g(a) (2006)) 
(finding no liability for breach of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act).  
 209. See, e.g., Lewis v. Saint Cloud State Univ., 693 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (declining to 
hold college responsible in defamation case brought by professor naming state university as defendant); 
Milliner v. Turner, 436 So. 2d 1300, 1302–03 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that, because state universities are 
“almost completely barred” under the First Amendment from exerting control over student expression, 
university was not proper defendant in libel suit stemming from accusations made in student editorial column); 
Mazart v. New York, 441 N.Y.S.2d. 600 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981) (finding that even though college provided financial 
support to student newspaper, college was not liable for purportedly defamatory news article because college 
had no authority to control manner in which students performed journalistic work).   
 210. This principle is best illustrated by a string of unfortunate cases involving situations in which schools 
were aware of off-campus parties but ultimately held not liable for damage students caused at the parties. See, 
e.g., Archbishop Coleman F. Carroll High Sch. v. Maynoldi, 30 So. 3d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (finding no 
school liability for an automobile accident involving a 17-year-old who drank at an off-campus party heavily 
promoted within the school, even though the principal dropped by the party to check on it); Rhea v. Grandview 
Sch. Dist. No. JT 116-200, 694 P.2d 666, 667 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to hold school liable for fatal 
accident involving student who drank at off-campus party, even though a teacher was aware of the students’ 
plans to buy alcohol). In the present day, schools are confronting a wave of litigation attempting to hold them 
responsible for acts of “cyberbullying” by students taking place off campus, and are defending themselves 
(almost always successfully) by demonstrating that they have neither the means nor the legal responsibility to 
monitor students’ social media lives. See generally Kathleen Conn, Allegations of School District Liability for 
Bullying, Cyberbullying, and Teen Suicides After Sexting: Are New Legal Standards Emerging in the Courts?, 37 
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 227 (2011) (surveying cyberbullying lawsuits alleging school 
district liability and identifying emerging legal standards that would establish school liability in some instances 
for monitored, off-campus student communication that occurs via social media). 
 211. See Browning, supra note 157, at 842–83 (posing scenario of a college that fails to prevent violence after 
reading a student-athlete’s violent statements on social media). Browning also notes that the terms of service on 
most social networking sites, including Facebook, prohibit account-holders from sharing passwords with third 
parties. Id. at 842. As institutions charged with teaching optimal behavior, colleges undermine their credibility 
when they compel students to breach contractual agreements.  
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unsolicited Facebook messages propositioning a classmate for sex—knowledge that 
a college normally would never have, without the password to a student’s 
account—might trigger liability under federal sex-discrimination statutes if the 
college fails to act and the target of the messages claims indifference to a sexually 
hostile campus environment.212 
Athletes do not have mobility or bargaining power analogous to that of 
employees. NCAA rules limit athletes to four seasons of competitive play in five 
calendar years, with a sixth year possible after petitioning for a discretionary 
waiver.213 Athletes are not free to change “employers” and seamlessly continue 
playing if they are aggrieved by mid-career rule changes. The NCAA requires 
athletes in the major intercollegiate sports to sit out a year if they switch schools, to 
discourage teams from trying to poach each other’s players. The transferee college 
has discretion to block a player from moving to a rival school, which at times has 
been invoked for competitive reasons.214 The “industry” of college sports, moreover, 
is hardly analogous to any traditional employment field (with the exception of 
professional sports leagues). A college athlete—especially one with aspirations of a 
professional career post-graduation—has limited ability to “do business with” an 
institution outside of the NCAA. The NCAA is, quite literally, the only game in 
town.215 
Moreover, even if the Garcetti approach did govern the free-expression rights of 
athletes in the “employ” of college athletic departments, most (if not all) of what 
institutions seek to regulate would be beyond a public employer’s reach. While 
Garcetti was about a memo written as part of an on-the-job assignment, no athlete 
is “assigned” to maintain a Facebook or Twitter presence. Nor can online updates 
about what an athlete thinks about gay rights—or what he ate for breakfast—be 
regarded as speech “pursuant to employment responsibilities.”216 Few college 
 
 212. See Bentley, supra note 5, at 838 (flagging a liability risk under the federal Title IX sex-discrimination 
statute if a college were “deliberately indifferent” to sexual harassment detected on students’ social media 
pages). 
 213. Charlie Armitz, NCAA Grants Trevor Mbakwe Sixth Year After ACL Tear in November, MINNESOTA 
DAILY, Mar, 26, 2012, at 1. See also Zak Brown, Note, What’s Said in This Locker Room, Stays in This Locker 
Room: Restricting the Social Media Use of College Athletes and the Implication for Their Institutions, 10 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 421, 431 (2012) (discussing NCAA bylaw that limits years of eligibility).  
 214. See, e.g., David Whitley, Players are Held Hostage by NCAA, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 1, 2009, at D1 
(reporting that University of Miami football coaches blocked former player Robert Marve from transferring to 
several schools, including all schools in the Atlantic Coast Conference and Southeastern Conference, as well as 
all other schools in Florida). 
 215. In 1984, the Supreme Court enjoined the NCAA, on antitrust grounds, from penalizing college athletic 
programs that negotiated broadcast-rights agreements apart from the NCAA’s global agreement, signed on 
behalf of its members. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). Quoting the district court 
below, the Court characterized the NCAA as a “classic cartel” with an “almost absolute control over the supply 
of college football which is made available to the networks, to television advertisers, and ultimately to the 
viewing public.” Id. at 96 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1295, 1300 
(W.D. Okla. 1982)). 
 216. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006). 
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athletic departments would readily accept the restrictions that the Supreme Court’s 
employee-speech jurisprudence places on government employers’ ability to restrict 
speech addressing matters of public concern, since at least some have punished 
athletes for attacking political figures or espousing unpopular views.217 Around-the-
clock control over opinions voiced on social media could not be sustained even 
under the standards that govern the employment relationship. 
B. Waiving Fundamental Rights: An Offer Students Can’t Refuse? 
Some college attorneys maintain that athletes may legitimately be required to waive 
any claim that social media monitoring violates their privacy or free-expression 
rights, as part of the Financial Aid Agreement that sets forth the terms of athletic 
scholarships.218 But to the extent that colleges are relying on contract theory to 
legitimize plenary control over their athletes’ social-media lives, the theory is flawed 
both as a matter of constitutional law and as a matter of basic contractual 
formalities. 
From the standpoint of contract law, the most obvious defect is that, in many 
well-publicized cases, social media bans have been imposed in midseason by fiat of 
a coach, not as part of a signed agreement.219 These midseason edicts represent a 
unilateral change in the terms of the relationship, not part of a bargained-for 
exchange. Further, while the initial choice of a college is a freely bargained 
marketplace transaction, renewing the contractual relationship in subsequent years 
is not. A student-athlete is under infirmities that significantly limit his mobility, and 
thus his ability to walk away from an onerous contract term.220 Among these is the 
simple matter of timing. Most institutions require substantial advance notice before 
accepting a transfer student; an athlete who is unpleasantly surprised by an 
 
 217. See, e.g., Cindy Boren, Player Kicked Off Team at North Alabama For Slur About Obama, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, (Dec. 18, 2012, 9:19 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early-lead/wp/2012/ 
12/18/north-alabama-player-kicked-off-team-for-racial-slur-about-obama/. 
 218. See, e.g., Stubblefield, supra note 6, at 598–600 (recommending a broad contractual waiver entitling 
coaches “to restrict or ban the use of social media websites at any time”).  
 219. At Florida State University, for example, football players were told to stay off Twitter amid a three-
game losing streak during the 2011 season. Ben Kercheval, Twitter Ban in Effect for FSU After Loss to Wake, 
NBCSPORTS.COM (Oct. 10, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/10/twtter-ban-
reportedly-in-effect-for-fsu-after-loss-to-wake. The University of North Carolina women’s basketball coach 
told her team to stop using Twitter during a spell of poor play during January 2012 because it was distracting 
them. Michael Lananna, Sylvia Hatchell Bans UNC Women’s Basketball Team’s Twitter Use, DAILY TAR HEEL 
(Jan. 27, 2012, 12:07 AM), http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2012/01/sylvia_hatchell_bans_womens_teams_ 
twitter_use. 
 220. See Eamonn Brennan, Want to Understand Transfer Rules? Give Up, ESPN (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:35 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/_/id/87697/trying-to-understand-transfer-rules-give-up 
(outlining the “dizzying” set of rules and bureaucratic processes that govern transfers in college athletics); NAT’L 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, TRANSFER 101: BASIC INFORMATION YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT TRANSFERRING TO 
AN NCAA COLLEGE (2012–13 ed. 2012), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/ 
productdownloads/TGONLINE2012.pdf.  
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unexpected term in the Financial Aid Agreement likely will be unable to seamlessly 
change colleges without interrupting his educational and playing career. For an 
athlete in his second, third or fourth years of college, the Financial Aid Agreement is 
a classic contract of adhesion, a take-it-or-leave-it proposition to which the only 
alternative may be quitting college altogether. And while contracts of adhesion 
typically are enforceable even when the parties stand in starkly uneven bargaining 
positions,221 an exceptionally broad waiver of First Amendment rights might trigger 
judicial scrutiny under the doctrine of unconscionability.222 
Perhaps more to the point, not all athletes receive scholarships, meals and 
housing. A substantial number of athletes “walk on” to their college teams. They 
sign no “letter of intent” committing them to enroll, and they receive no 
compensation beyond the intangible benefits of athletic participation.223 It is highly 
unlikely that a coach would accede to two differing levels of control over players, 
one for those receiving financial benefits and another for walk-ons. Since a coach 
will assert the same level of control over non-scholarship as well as scholarship 
athletes, an athletic department’s authority over players’ speech cannot be based on 
the scholarship contract. 
Requiring a student to sign away constitutional rights in exchange for the 
opportunity to play sports risks running afoul of the “unconstitutional conditions” 
doctrine. As Professor Epstein has explained the doctrine, “even if a state has 
absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the 
privilege subject to conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the 
waiver of constitutional rights.”224 A requirement to waive constitutional rights as a 
condition of receiving a government benefit will be held unconstitutional if the  
 
 
 
 
 221. See Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1035, 1082 (2010) (“[T]wo of the defining characteristics of adhesion 
contracts — the inequality of bargaining power between the parties and the inability of the non-drafting party 
to bargain over the contract’s terms — are not prerequisites to contract formation.”). 
 222. See id. at 1091 (defining “an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together 
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party” as an essential element of the 
unconscionability doctrine (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 
1965))). 
 223. See Otis B. Grant, African American College Football Players and the Dilemma of Exploitation, Racism, 
and Education: A Socio-Economic Analysis of Sports Law, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 645, 653, 659 n.96 (2003); see also 
Kerry Brown, Walking On 101, NCSA ATHLETIC RECRUITING BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012, 9:25 AM), 
http://www.ncsasports.org/blog/2012/10/25/walking-101/ (explaining that walk-on athletes cannot sign letters 
of intent and “oftentimes will not receive the same attention and privileges as [their] teammates”). 
 224. Richard Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (1988).  
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right “has little or no relationship” to the withheld benefit.225 Interposing the artifice 
of a contract so as to make the government coercion appear voluntary does not 
legitimize the exaction, because “the state cannot accomplish indirectly that which 
it has been constitutionally prohibited from doing directly.”226 Significantly, a 
citizen may challenge a coercive condition as unconstitutional even  when the 
condition is tied to a purely discretionary benefit.227 Consequently, that a college 
student has no vested constitutional right in participating in sports or any other 
extracurricular activity would not be fatal to a legal challenge. 
In the past term, the Supreme Court reinvigorated the seldom-invoked 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the case of Agency for Int’l Development v. 
Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.228 There, a coalition of nongovernmental 
organizations receiving USAID funding for anti-AIDS programming in Africa 
challenged a federal requirement that grant recipients enact a statement explicitly 
opposing the practice of prostitution.229 The organizations were concerned that 
staking out such a position risked alienating government officials in host countries 
and making it more difficult to work supportively with prostitutes in combating 
HIV.230 Relying on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the Supreme Court 
held that the requirement represented an unlawful coercive use of government 
funding to compel a grant recipient to alter its constitutionally protected message 
“outside the scope of the federally funded program.”231 
The determination whether a condition is unconstitutional thus turns on the 
pivotal question of whether the condition is “within the scope” of the government 
benefit on which it is contingent. While a tightly drawn restriction on social media 
use during the performance of or preparation for an athletic competition might 
well survive scrutiny, a broader proscription will be constitutionally suspect. The 
“scope” of a college athletic program does not extend to all off-hours expressive 
activity. The student/school setting is perhaps uniquely well suited to a challenge 
under the theory of unconstitutional conditions, because the doctrine is understood 
 
 225. Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)). In Lebron, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Florida regulators violated 
the Constitution by requiring welfare recipients to submit to drug screening as a condition for benefits under 
the federally funded Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. Id. at 1217–18. See also Thomas v. 
Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (holding that a Jehovah’s Witness could not be 
denied unemployment benefits on the grounds of his refusal to forsake his religious objections to working in a 
weapons factory because, “a person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment 
right and participation in an otherwise available public program”). 
 226. Lebron, 710 F.3d at 1217. 
 227. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) (arguing 
that the “government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional 
right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether”). 
 228. 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). 
 229. Id. at 2324 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006)). 
 230. Id. at 2326. 
 231. Id. at 2230–32 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991)). 
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as protecting not just the individual who is subject to the coercive bargain but the 
larger society as a whole. Understood in this way, the refusal to recognize the 
validity of a purported waiver of rights gives effect to the Constitution as not just a 
grant of affirmative individual rights but as a check on overreaching by 
government.232 With the possible exception of prison, there is no setting where the 
power differential between individual and government is more pronounced than at 
school, and courts should look especially critically at contracts imposed on 
relatively unsophisticated counterparties purporting to widen that power 
differential. A broad waiver of the First Amendment right to engage in 
“inappropriate” speech unrelated to athletics, or of the Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest in social media login information233 enabling an athletic department to read 
even private one-to-one messages, is thus vulnerable to challenge as an 
unconstitutional condition. 
Regardless of whether an express written waiver exists, schools may argue that 
voluntary participation in the activity itself operates as an implicit acceptance of the 
coach’s and athletic department’s conditions.234 The “implied waiver” argument 
superficially finds some support in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressing 
the Fourth Amendment rights of K-12 students ordered to submit to drug testing as 
a condition of taking part in extracurricular activities. On examination, however, 
the situations are not materially analogous.235 
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the families of student-athletes at an 
Oregon high school challenged the school district’s decision to require a signed 
waiver acceding to random drug testing as a condition of playing interscholastic 
sports.236 While recognizing that a drug test qualifies as a “search” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the drug-testing regime 
imposed no unreasonable intrusion on the students’ privacy.237 The Court observed 
 
 232. Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 513 
(May 2012) (“Constitutional rights . . . are not private rights, which the rights holders can barter away or 
otherwise relinquish as they please. On the contrary, they are legal limits legislated by the people, and this has 
implications for the significance of consent.”). 
 233. See, e.g., R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (D. Minn. 
2012). Although a court likely would not recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy where postings were 
shared with hundreds of Facebook or Twitter followers, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence strongly supports an 
alternative argument that government actors may not engage in suspicionless searches of private messages. See, 
e.g., id. (finding an actionable invasion of privacy where a principal learned that two middle school classmates 
had engaged in an out-of-school, sex-related conversation, forced one of the students to log into Facebook, and 
then examined the student’s private messages). 
 234. This “implied waiver” argument can be seen as underlying courts’ willingness to compromise the First 
Amendment rights of government employees and students generally. See Moss, supra note 38, at 1643–48 
(2007) (explaining waiver rationale but finding it unpersuasive in the school setting, where the speaker’s choices 
are limited by practical realities, including the necessity of changing residences to enroll in a different school 
district). 
 235. See infra notes 239–241 and accompanying text. 
 236. 515 U.S. 646, 651 (1995). 
 237. Id. at 665. 
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that student-athletes already accept diminished privacy, including communal 
showering and locker facilities.238 “By choosing to ‘go out for the team,’” the 
majority stated, the athletes “voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of 
regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally,” including 
minimum grade-point standards, mandatory insurance coverage, and a preseason 
physical.239 On the opposing side of the scale, the Court found two legitimate 
government interests that outweighed the sacrifice of students’ privacy: first, that 
drug use presented an imminent physical danger to safety, including the safety of 
innocent teammates and opponents, and second, that the evidence established a 
“crisis” level of defiance of drug laws and other illicit behavior in this particular 
district, which in the school’s judgment could be ameliorated by curbing drug use 
among student “role models.”240 
The Court then expanded on Vernonia in Board of Education of Independent 
School District No. 92 v. Earls, finding no Fourth Amendment violation in a more 
expansive drug-testing regimen applying to all students taking part in 
extracurriculars, not just athletes.241 The school’s factual case in Earls was significant 
weaker – there was no evidence of a “crisis” level of drug abuse, and little indication 
that students posed a danger to others while using drugs during choir or glee club – 
yet a 5-4 majority found the policy “minimally intrusive” and justified by the 
school’s health and safety concerns.242 Notably, the relatively mild consequences of a 
positive drug test were pivotal to the majority’s conclusion. For a first offense, the 
school imposed no punishment beyond a parental conference and a mandatory 
follow-up test; a student would be suspended from participation only after failing a 
second test, and dismissed from the activity only after failing a third time.243 
Vernonia and Earls, to the extent that they apply in the college setting at all, do 
not logically lead to the conclusion that students taking part in sports implicitly 
waive all constitutional rights. The Court’s reasoning was a straightforward 
application of the balancing-of-interests that always applies to Fourth Amendment 
challenges.244 Colleges defending the punishment of “offensive” or “inappropriate” 
speech—or defending a categorical prohibition on social media—would be asking 
for a deviation from the Supreme Court’s established First Amendment 
jurisprudence, not an application of it. In the First Amendment context, unlike in 
 
 238. Id. at 657. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 661–63. 
 241. 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002). 
 242. Id. at 834, 838. 
 243. Id. at 833–34. 
 244. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377–78 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (holding 
that reasonableness of a police “inventory search” of impounded automobile “requires a weighing of the 
governmental and societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions against the constitutionally protected 
interest of the individual citizen in the privacy of his effects”). 
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Fourth Amendment cases, courts are limited in their ability to assign differing 
values to individual speakers’ constitutional interests.245 There is no First 
Amendment equivalent to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” that is at the 
heart of every Fourth Amendment assessment.246 (If there were, that factor assuredly 
would cut against a government demand for access to the nonpublic portions of 
password-protected social media accounts.) More to the point, drug testing is 
limited to detecting unlawful  activity that poses a physical danger to the student 
and to others. Colleges’ asserted control over social media is not limited to unlawful 
or physically dangerous behavior. The ability to prevent and punish dangerous 
criminal behavior in no way suggests by extension the ability to also prevent and 
punish non-dangerous lawful behavior. 
C. High School Athletics: A Special Case 
While the public and policymakers are focused on the higher-profile setting of 
college athletics, at least some K-12 schools are asserting control over their student 
athletes’ online speech comparable to those seen at the college level.247 The high 
school setting presents a range of unique issues not present at the college level that 
may actually make it harder to defend the legality of broad content-based 
restrictions on athletes’ speech. 
Depriving a student of participation in athletics at the high school level raises 
constitutional questions not present in college. Every state constitution entitles 
students to the benefits of a public education.248 In at least one state, California, the 
 
 245. In recent years, the Supreme Court has emphasized that it does not weigh the relative merits of 
individual speakers’ messages when deciding whether their speech falls within the bounds of the First 
Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (stating, in finding that First 
Amendment protects speech of politician who falsely claimed to have won military honors, “The Nation well 
knows that one of the costs of the First Amendment is that it protects the speech we detest as well as the speech 
we embrace. Though few might find respondent’s statements anything but contemptible, his right to make 
those statements is protected by the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech and expression.”). But see 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (balancing interest of freedom of speech with 
society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior protecting 
minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) 
(tempering freedom of speech with special characteristics of school environment and governmental interest in 
stopping student drug abuse). 
 246. “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy.’” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)). 
 247. See, e.g., Mark Demsky, Students Railing Against Social Media Contract Implemented by School District, 
FOX40.COM (Aug. 2, 2013), http://fox40.com/2013/08/02/school-district-forcing-student-athletes-to-sign-
social-media-contract/) (last viewed Aug. 3, 2013) (describing how Northern California school district, in a 
purported effort to address online bullying, enacted a mandatory “contract” for athletics and other after-school 
activities requiring students to refrain from any “inappropriate” speech on social media). 
 248. Emily Bloomenthal, Inadequate Discipline: Challenging Zero Tolerance Policies as Violating State 
Constitution Education Clauses, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 329 (2011); Patricia M. Harris, Note, 
Student Fees in Public Schools: Defining the Scope of Education, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1401, 1402 (1987). 
LoMonte PP2 (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2014  2:00 PM 
 Frank D. LoMonte 
Vol. 9, No. 1 2014 45 
right to a free public education is understood to encompass extracurricular as well 
as classroom activities, because extracurricular activities are viewed as an essential 
element of the learning experience.249 Once a public benefit is constitutionally 
guaranteed without condition, a state may not condition receipt of the benefit on 
waiving fundamental rights (particularly where, as in the case of California, the 
rights of students to speak freely both on and off campus are the subject of a battery 
of statutory protections buttressing federal First Amendment protections).250 Since 
no one is constitutionally guaranteed a free college education, there is no 
comparable constitutional interest at stake.251 
Excluding a student from extracurricular activities in high school also carries the 
consequence of diminished college opportunity. While extracurricular activities at 
college are (for all but the tiny fraction of professional-prospect athletes) merely a 
rewarding diversion, for high school students they are an increasingly essential part 
of the college-preparation track. To deny a student the opportunity for what may be 
the difference-making credential between college acceptance and rejection is a 
decision of momentous gravity. 
VI. CHALLENGING SCHOOL REGULATORY OR PUNITIVE ACTIONS 
A. Practical Impediments Discourage Constitutional Challenges to College 
Disciplinary Decisions 
That a college athlete has yet to litigate a constitutional case about freedom of 
expression on social media speaks to the inherent difficulties for any student—
especially an athlete—in taking a college to court and obtaining meaningful relief. 
The clock is a student plaintiff’s enemy. Requests for injunctive relief are likely to be 
pronounced moot, even at the appellate level, as soon as the athlete graduates or 
expends his eligibility so as no longer to be aggrieved by the constraint he is 
 
 249. See Hartzell v. Connell, 35 P.2d 35, 42 (Cal. 1984) (“It can no longer be denied that extracurricular 
activities constitute an integral component of public education. Such activities are generally recognized as a 
fundamental ingredient of the educational process.”) (internal quotes omitted). Courts in several others states, 
however, have taken narrower views of what falls within the bundle of benefits constituting a free public 
education. See, e.g., Paulson v. Minidoka Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 331, 463 P.2d 935, 938 (Idaho 1970); Hamer v. 
Bd. of Educ., 265 N.E.2d 616, 621 (Ill. 1970). The Supreme Court found no fundamental constitutional right to 
any particular level of education even at the K-12 level. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
18 (1973). 
 250. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (guaranteeing students in K-12 schools the right of free expression except 
where speech is unlawful or presents a clear and present danger of inciting unlawful or substantially disruptive 
behavior); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950 (prohibiting K-12 schools from disciplining students for speech that 
would be protected by the First Amendment if uttered off campus). 
 251. See, e.g., Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 570 F.2d 320, 321 (10th Cir. 1978) (finding that intercollegiate 
hockey players had no constitutionally protected property interest in continued athletic participation that could 
support a due process challenge to the NCAA’s decision to suspend them). 
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challenging.252 And the clock presents practical as well as legal disincentives – even a 
complete victory restoring the ability to play college football is unlikely to be of 
much value to a 28-year-old. 
The intimidating power differential between student and institution presents a 
powerful psychological barrier. An athlete who is suspended from participation but 
remains part of the program, or has hopes of returning, will understandably hesitate 
to take the coach and athletic director to court. Even if an athlete wrongfully 
banned from the team could obtain timely injunctive relief, the adversarial 
proceeding could poison the player/coach relationship. 
B. Deprivation of Athletic Participation and “Material Adversity” 
It would be especially difficult to litigate a case if the state-imposed sanction is 
something short of a complete loss of educational opportunity—for instance, a 
benching or a suspension for several games. Courts understandably will defer to the 
internal team tactical decisions of coaches in the same way that they defer to the in-
class curricular decisions of teachers and professors, hesitant to wade into refereeing 
who deserves playing time at which position. 
Demonstrating an actionably serious deprivation may pose difficulty for an 
athlete who suffers no concrete loss of financial benefits.  Even if an athlete were 
able to demonstrate that the loss of playing time diminished his appeal to 
professional leagues, the likelihood of a professional athletic career is so remote that 
courts will hesitate to recognize a cognizable injury. In one recent example (having 
nothing to do with freedom of expression), a state appellate court rejected an array 
of tort and contract claims lodged by former University of North Carolina football 
star Michael McAdoo, who sought recompense from the university because of his 
removal from the team resulting from an academic scandal.253 The court found no 
compensable injury because McAdoo lost only playing time, not his scholarship, 
housing and other tangible benefits; the court dismissed as “conjectural” the 
suggestion that, with the benefit of a full senior season, McAdoo would have signed 
a more lucrative deal than the free-agent contract he landed with the Baltimore 
Ravens of the National Football League. 254 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Rutan and in Burlington 
Northern, an athlete punished for the content of speech should be able to mount a 
First Amendment retaliation claim even if deprived of a benefit that is intangible, if 
 
 252. See Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007) (dismissing, as moot, the First Amendment 
claims of student newspaper editors who sought to enjoin their university from future acts of censorship 
because, while the appeal was pending, the editors graduated and thus were no longer in a position to benefit 
from injunctive relief). 
 253. McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C., 736 S.E.2d 811, 814 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). 
 254. See id. at 823 (“Although any specific level of injury to Plaintiff’s career prospects and earning potential 
is too ‘conjectural’ and ‘hypothetical’ to estimate, it is clear that the actions of [the university] did not prevent 
Plaintiff from pursuing a professional football career.”). 
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it is sufficiently valuable. Losing the ability to play a sport for a sustained period is 
an injury that, while not quantifiable in dollars, would deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from engaging in the same type of speech again, and would send a chilling 
message to others on the team as well.255 As a matter of public policy, if it can be 
shown that a government official acted with the intent to punish or deter 
constitutionally protected speech, and that the action in fact was likely to succeed, 
the official’s choice of weapon should be of little significance.256 The suggestion in 
cases such as Lowery that a deprivation is not actionable because there is no 
constitutional right to play sports ignores fifty years of Supreme Court guidance, 
beginning with Keyishian, that even the loss of a discretionary “privilege” can 
constitute unlawful retaliation.257 
VII. RESOLVING – AND PREVENTING – CONSTITUTIONAL CLASHES 
To summarize, an athlete attending a state institution should have considerable 
First Amendment protection against content-based punishment for off-campus 
speech on personal time, or against broad-based restrictions that place entire 
methods of communication off-limits. State institutions will have, at the very most, 
the ability to regulate and punish speech that presents the imminent risk of 
substantially disrupting their operations or breaking the law.258 A contract 
purporting to broadly surrender constitutional rights and accept punishment for 
otherwise legally protected speech would be viewed with justified skepticism, since 
participation in state programs cannot be conditioned on a waiver of constitutional 
rights unrelated to the program’s functions. Prohibitions against specific types of 
speech should be governed by the scrutiny accompanying content-based 
restrictions, which in the “real world” outside of campus rarely are upheld without 
the compelling justification that appears lacking in the athletic setting. Prohibitions 
on the use of particular types of social media should be analyzed both for 
overbreadth (because they restrict the harmless use of the medium) and for 
underinclusiveness (because they leave equally harmful channels of communication 
 
 255. See T.V. v. Smith-Greene, 807 F.Supp.2d 767, 780 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding, in the case of high school 
volleyball players removed from their team because of sexual humor in a video shot at an off-campus slumber 
party, that being denied the chance to play high school sports was a sufficiently severe punishment to trigger 
First Amendment scrutiny: “a student cannot be punished with a ban from extracurricular activities for non-
disruptive speech”). 
 256. See Levinson, supra note 101, at 674–75 (criticizing some courts’ reluctance to recognize a retaliation 
claim short of proof of a “material change” in pay or benefits, because “such decisions send a dangerous 
message to government employers that they may penalize those who exercise their First Amendment rights 
provided their retaliatory conduct falls short of a ‘material change’ in the terms or conditions of employment”).  
 257. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (stating that a denial of a tax exemption is a 
deprivation of freedom of speech even though specific tax exemption is a privilege). 
 258. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972) (recognizing that if there were an evidential basis to 
support the conclusion that student group posed a threat of disruption, then limitation on this freedom of 
speech on a state-supported institution would be justified); supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text. 
LOMONTE PP2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2014  2:00 PM 
 Fouling the First Amendment 
48 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
unregulated, so as to make the prohibition ineffective). The more distant the 
expression is from the actual performance of team responsibilities, the less authority 
a school will be able to assert over it. Even if the punishment for “inappropriate” 
speech is only a suspension from team participation, the materiality of the loss 
should be addressed as a matter of damages and should not entirely foreclose 
recovery on a First Amendment retaliation claim. 
Colleges do not need boundless authority over their athletes’ off-campus speech 
to protect their legitimate institutional interests, because narrower and less speech-
restrictive alternatives exist. For example, intellectual-property law already provides 
legal recourse for colleges where the unauthorized use of trademarked logos or 
images might suggest official sponsorship of a student’s purely personal speech.259 A 
college could consequently order an athlete to cease displaying a trademarked logo, 
mascot or other mark accompanying a social media account in a way that implies 
the student is speaking as a representative of the school.260 A reasonable “time, place 
and manner” prohibition comparable to those in the professional football and 
basketball leagues that restricts athletes from posting to social media during and 
immediately before games would likely be upheld, as it is narrowly tailored to 
minimize distractions.261 Additionally, college administrators—like any member of 
the public—may freely view the publicly available portions of athletes’ social media 
presences. While they rarely may impose punishment for “pure speech,” they 
remain free within their jurisdiction to punish the underlying illicit behavior they 
discover through social media (e.g., tweets evidencing that the athlete accepts 
money from sports agents). 
Marketplace responses already provide ample incentive for students to maintain 
a “clean” social media profile. As illustrated by the declining NFL valuation of 
Marvin Austin, the University of North Carolina footballer who dropped from a  
 
 
 
 259. Federal law provides a cause of action for the “dilution” of a “famous” mark, such as by falsely 
associating it with an unsavory product in a way that diminishes its value. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
Social-networking sites have themselves developed policies for deactivating infringing accounts upon receipt of 
a verified infringement claim from the owner of a mark. See, e.g., Facebook Copyright Policy, 
http://www.facebook.com/legal/copyright.php (last viewed Aug. 12, 2013). 
 260. The University of Maryland is among those specifically instructing athletes not to use the university’s 
“wordmarks, logs or images” without applying to the college for permission. See Social Media Guidelines for 
Student-Athletes, Maryland Athletics, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-
2019/WashingtonPost/2011/10/13/CapitalBusiness/Graphics/Student%20Athlete%20Social%20Media%20Guid
elines.pdf. 
 261. For example, the University of Houston, for instructs athletes not to use social media four hours before 
athletic department events or between midnight and 5 a.m. on the night before a competition. Bentley, supra 
note 154, at 477. 
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likely first-round draft pick to a second-round draftee after a suspension cost him 
his senior season,262 intemperate speech on social media can limit a student’s 
employment prospects. Private employers are free to exact penalties that 
government regulators are not. Teaching students about mindful social media use 
enhances their employability. Kicking students out of extracurricular activities, in 
the name of “punishing to teach,” limits their employability. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In April 2013, Rutgers University fired its head basketball coach, Mike Rice, Jr., 
after the sports network ESPN aired videos taken at practice sessions exposing how 
Rice mistreated athletes, including shoving, kicking, cursing and throwing 
basketballs at them.263 Although the abuse was reported to have dated back to the 
2010-11 season, it took more than two years—and a fired Rutgers staffer’s decision 
to leak the films—to bring Rice’s behavior to light.264 Why would students accept 
such cruelty and unprofessionalism from a “responsible adult” who is supposed to 
be looking out for their welfare? One explanation lies in the culture of control that 
athletic departments have cultivated—erecting barriers that limit athletes’ ability to 
have uncensored contact with the outside world, and enforcing a “my way or the 
highway” climate in which every player knows his future can be inalterably 
damaged if he is marked as a troublemaker. Banning or monitoring athletes’ use of 
social media cuts off one more “lifeline” by which mistreated players like those at 
Rutgers might reach out for help.265 Just the existence of monitoring sends the 
unmistakable message that people with life-or-death control over an athlete’s 
educational and professional future are standing by to punish any step over the 
party line. 
The notion that educational institutions must necessarily “punish to teach” 
reflects a failure of pedagogical creativity and, in the end analysis, a failure of trust  
 
 
 262. See Mike Garafolo, Giants’ Hakeem Nicks Says Draftee Marvin Austin is a ‘Great Kid’” STAR-LEDGER 
(May 5, 2011). http://www.nj.com/giants/index.ssf/2011/05/giants_hakeem_nicks_says_draft.html) (describing 
how questions about Austin’s character “caused a player with first-round talent to drop to the second day of the 
draft”). 
 263. Rutgers Fires Coach Mike Rice,” ESPN (Apr. 3, 2013), http://espn.go.com/new-york/mens-college-
basketball/story/_/id/9128825/Rutgers-scarlet-knights-fire-coach-mike-rice-wake-video-scandal. 
 264. Don Van Natta, Jr., Video Shows Mike Rice’s Ire, ESPN (Apr. 3, 2013), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/ 
story/_/id/9125796/practice-video-shows-rutgers-basketball-coach-mike-rice-berated-pushed-used-slurs-
players.  
 265. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1237 (10th Cir. 1996); Rebecca L. Zeidel, Note, Forecasting 
Disruption, Forfeiting Speech: Restrictions on Student Speech in Extracurricular Activities, 53 B.C. L. REV. 303, 339 
(2012) (making the point that legal protection for speech critical of coaches’ professional conduct “may serve an 
important safety function in reporting egregious conduct and dangerous conditions”). 
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in the ability of speakers and audiences to parse that which is meaningful from that 
which is momentarily diverting—a trust exemplified by Justice Fortas’ rousing 
words in Tinker: 
Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word 
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the 
views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But 
our Constitution says we must take this risk . . . and our history says that it 
is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis 
of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans 
who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, 
society.266 
Outside of the school and workplace settings, it is increasingly well-accepted that 
the “price” of free speech—that people will be exposed to unwelcome ideas, at times 
presented in harsh or unsophisticated terms—is a price that a democratic society 
must gladly incur. None of the consequences that colleges’ speech restrictions seek 
to avoid—that the college or its athletes might suffer reputational harm, that an 
athlete might be disqualified from competition, that a coach might feel his authority 
threatened, that locker-room dissent might result in losing a game—is of any great 
moment when weighed against the compromise of fundamental freedoms. Even if 
our legal system has sometimes lost sight when the speaker is a student of the 
paramount importance of the individual voice over the convenience and comfort of 
government regulators, our educational system should not. 
 
 
 266. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. at 508–09 (1969). 
